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FROM INACTIVITY TO FULL
ENFORCEMENT: THE IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE “DO NO HARM” APPROACH IN
INITIAL COIN OFFERINGS
Marco Dell’Erba ∗
This Article analyzes the way the Securities and Exchange Commission
(“SEC”) has enforced securities laws with regard to Initial Coin
Offerings (“ICOs”). In a speech held in 2016, the U.S. Commodities
Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) Chairman Christopher
Giancarlo emphasized the similarities between the advent of the
blockchain technology and the Internet era. He offered the “do no
harm” approach as the best way to regulate blockchain technology.
The Clinton administration implemented the “do no harm” approach
at the beginning of the Internet Era in the 1990s when regulators
sought to support technological innovations without stifling them with
burdensome rules.
This Article suggests that the SEC adopted a “do no harm
approach” and successfully pursued two of its fundamental
institutional goals when enforcing securities laws in the context of
ICOs: investor protection and preservation of capital formation. After
providing a brief description of the basics of ICOs and the way they
have evolved in the last two years, this Article examines the transition
into a new phase of full enforcement action implemented by the SEC.
This shift from inactivity to enforcement was gradual, characterized by
clearly identifiable steps. Data on ICOs demonstrates that this
rigorous enforcement of securities laws has not damaged the industry
in the United States and may suggest that entrepreneurs have adapted
to this enforcement approach. By contrast, a lack of enforcement
would have probably increased uncertainty to the detriment of
investors and entrepreneurs and put the UNITED STATES at a
disadvantage in the international arena. Furthermore, this paper
emphasizes the importance of pursuing specific goals in the short-tomedium term, particularly in order to make securities regulation
uniform and avoid differences at the state and federal levels, as well as
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to encourage industry authorities such as Self-Regulatory
Organizations (SROs) to develop high standards for self-regulation.
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INTRODUCTION
In recent decades, significant technological innovations, though welcomed by the financial sector, have posed new challenges for regulators.
Many envision blockchain, a recent example of technological innovation, as
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reshaping financial markets and commercial practices. The technology utilizes a distributed database to hold a secure and immutable record of past
transactions. This technology has the potential for a broad range of uses. In
the context of entrepreneurial finance, Initial Coin Offerings (“ICOs”) have
emerged as a disruptive trend in capital formation, with a view to further
disintermediating the traditional banking system as well as private funds, in
1
particular venture capital.
Technological (infrastructural) innovations, such as blockchain, may be
distinguished from traditional financial innovation. Financial innovation is a
systematic and constant trend in finance: although it varies in its intensity,
financial innovation has always existed. An example of financial innovation
as a constant element in all eras is the development of the so-called Commenda in the Middle Ages, the antecedent of modern investment trusts and
2
private funds, created with the purpose of diversifying risk.
As opposed to systematic financial innovation, the implementation of
totally new technologies and infrastructures happens at a more recognizable
and specific time “Zero.” The Internet is a clear example of infrastructural
technology. The so-called Internet era started exactly twenty-five years ago
as a mass phenomenon, when the European Center for Nuclear Research
(“CERN”) made the most famous software associated with it (the “world
wide web”) free, renouncing any rights to the software protocols created by
its researcher Tim-Berners Lee. The creation and the mass adoption of the
Internet represented a disruptive event and clearly displayed significant consequences in terms of the interconnection and rapidity of the financial markets, coupled with significant economies of scale.
Similar to the Internet revolution, Distributed Ledger Technology
(“DLT,” commonly known as blockchain technology) attempts to reshape
financial markets, enhancing the construction of a markedly disintermediated model, where the technology theoretically eliminates the need of established institutions operating as central validators. Blockchain is part of a
3
broader trend in the financial sector: the rise of Fintech. A common trait of

1.
See generally Marco Dell’Erba, Initial Coin Offerings: The First Response of Regulatory Authorities, 14 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 1109 (2018).
2.
The Commenda was an act on behalf of, but not in the name of, another. The commendator conferred to a tractator, generally a merchant, an amount that had to be employed
for a certain time to pursue a performance, so that the commendator could have a gain. The
tractator had full managerial powers. For a historical perspective, see Henry Hansmann,
Rainer Kraakman & Richard Squire, Law and the Rise of the Firm, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1335,
1372–74 (2006); see also Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition 352 (1983); Robert Yee, Financial Innovation and Commenda Contracts
in Medieval Europe, VAND. HIST. REV. (Oct. 30, 2016), http://vanderbilthistoricalreview.com/
financial-innovation-and-commenda-contracts.
3.
Fintech, a term coined in 1990, refers to any technological application to deliver
financial solutions. See Douglas W. Arner, Jànos Barberis & Ross P. Buckley, The Evolution
of Fintech: A New Post-Crisis Paradigm? (Univ. of Hong Kong Faculty of Law, Research
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Fintech companies is that they combine digital technologies with financial
services and consumer finance in innovative ways. The Fintech sector is
highly diverse. Some of them open up new markets in the financial industry;
others offer new solutions for existing products or services offered by
banks, asset managers, or insurance companies. The entities and activities
summarised under the “Fintech” label are as diverse as the regulations to
which they are subject. Indeed, some of the technological innovations from
these providers have created new financial products and services that escape
the current regulatory perimeter (so-called “sector-transcending” innovation).
When referring to technological transformation that leads to epochal
changes, regulators face two problems corresponding to two different and
potentially conflicting goals.
The first problem is of a strictly legal nature: regulators have to consider the applicability of the existing legal framework to the new technology
4
and the possibility or feasibility of enacting new regulation. Blockchain, in
particular, helped exaggerate the disparity between the linear rate of regulation and the exponential rate of technological development. This phenomenon requires a reassessment of the role of legal definitions—how they are
elaborated, structured (i.e., broad versus specific legal categories), and interpreted. This problem is of absolute relevance in the context of initial coin
offerings (“ICOs”). Indeed, SEC Chairman Jay Clayton and CFTC Chairman Christopher Giancarlo emphasized this in a joint statement, tackling the
issue from the perspective of the cryptocurrency market:
A key issue before market regulators is whether our historic approach to the regulation of currency transactions is appropriate for
the cryptocurrency markets. Check-cashing and moneytransmission services that operate in the U.S. are primarily stateregulated. Many of the internet-based cryptocurrency trading platforms have registered as payment services and are not subject to direct oversight by the SEC or the CFTC. We would support policy

Paper No. 2015/047, 2015); Mark Hochstein, Fintech (the Word, That Is) Evolves, AM.
BANKER (Oct. 5, 2015, 7:12 PM), http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/fintech-theword-that-is-evolves-1077098-1.html; see also Douglas W. Arner, Jànos Barberis & Ross P.
Buckley, FinTech, RegTech and the Reconceptualization of Financial Regulation, 37 NW. J.
INT’L L. & BUS. 371, 406–07 (2017); Chris Brummer, Prologue to Daniel Gorfine, FinTech
Innovation: Building a 21st Century Regulator, IIEL ISSUE BRIEF, Nov. 2017, at 2, 3. Here
the author identifies peculiar characteristics of today’s Fintech when comparing it with its
predecessors.
4.
The two different positions on the need for new regulations can be traced in Frank
H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207, 208
(1996), and Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113
HARV. L. REV. 501, 502 (1999).
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efforts to revisit these frameworks and ensure they are effective and
5
efficient for the digital era.
From a broader perspective, a second challenge for regulators is figuring out how to avoid frustrating the potential adoption of the new technological innovation when considering the application of existing regulation or
the enactment of a new regulatory framework. Even in this sense, Internet
technology offers a valuable precedent; at the beginning of the Internet era,
the Clinton administration explicitly referred to a “do no harm” approach.
This regulatory approach of not stifling technological innovation with burdensome regulation proved to be the best, and it had positive consequences
for the American economy, increasing the amount of investments in the Internet’s infrastructure, and favoring “a rapid expansion in access that supported swift deployment and mass adoption of Internet-based technolo6
gies.”
Although the law is necessary to the creation of a healthy environment
where technology could prosper, the two perspectives may be in conflict
and the right balance between the two might be difficult to achieve. Intuitively, the best way to promote legal certainty may be the extension of existing regulation. However, such an extension may frustrate technological innovation, especially when technology theoretically leads to the creation of a
new concept contrasting with the existing regulation. Similarly, the alternative of providing an “ad-hoc” regulation may prove to be burdensome and
contribute to fragmentation of the existing regulatory framework, also affecting the development of the new technology.
Further, the tension between the two perspectives is emphasized by
Giancarlo and Clayton when taking into account the two underlying interests corresponding to two different (but complementary) missions of securities agencies like the SEC: investor protection and capital formation. Such
tension emerges in the joint statement by Giancarlo and Clayton.
On that basis, this Article explores the way the SEC shifted from an initial phase of inactivity to a new phase of full enforcement, highlighting specific advantages and disadvantages of this strategy. Parts I provides a brief
description of ICOs, what they are, and how they evolved. Part II considers
the problem of technological innovation from the perspective of regulators
and lays out the meaning of a “do no harm approach” in the context of

5.
Jay Clayton & J. Christopher Giancarlo, Regulators Are Looking at Cryptocurrency, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 24, 2018, 6:26 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/regulators-arelooking-at-cryptocurrency-1516836363.
6.
Christopher Giancarlo, Chairman, Comm. Fut. Trading Comm’n, Written Testimony Before the Senate Banking Committee 13 (Feb. 6, 2018), https://www.banking.senate.gov/
public/_cache/files/d6c0f0b6-757d-4916-80fd-a43315228060/
A2A6C1D8DDBB7AD33EBE63254D80E9E3.giancarlotestimony-2-6-18b.pdf.
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ICOs. It also considers the enforcement of the SEC towards ICOs. Part III
analyzes the pros and cons of such enforcement.

I. INITIAL COIN OFFERINGS
A. Main Features and Mechanics
7

ICOs have emerged as a revolutionary tool for entrepreneurial finance,
facilitating and accelerating the critical phase of capital formation, bypassing traditional banks and venture capitalists. ICOs respond to the need for
entrepreneurs (especially those engaged in the creation of highly innovative
start-ups) to find new sources of capital to finance their new ventures. In an
economic era characterized by a significant financial crisis, coupled with
8
more stringent regulation (in particular Basel II and Basel III) , access to
funding for new ventures became much harder than in the past. This com9
plex situation led to the phenomenon of banking disintermediation, with
10
the emergence of the shadow banking system, and a contextual and gradual inclusion of small investors through crowdfunding or peer-to-peer lending, with the venture capital industry unable to innovate its basic paradigms
11
for a long time.
Despite their perceived similarities to Initial Public Offerings (“IPOs”)
and crowdfunding campaigns on platforms such as Kickstarter and Indie-

7.
Sabrina Howell, Marina Niessner & David Yermack, Initial Coin Offerings: Financing Growth with Cryptocurrency Token Sales 2 (European Corp. Governance Ins., Finance Working Paper No. 564/2018, 2018).
8.
In particular, Basel III has exercised a higher pressure on banks and their Return on
Equity (RoE) by increasing capital requirements and risk weighted assets. See EUR. BANKING
AUTH., OVERVIEW OF THE POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS OF REGULATORY MEASURES FOR
BANKS’ BUSINESS MODELS 13 (2015), https://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/974844/
Report+-+Overview+of+the+potential+implications+of+regulatory+measures+for+business+
models.pdf/fd839715-ce6d-4f48-aa8d-0396ffc146b9.
9.
Banking disintermediation typically occurs when corporations obtain funding from
sources other than banks, whether funding is provided from non-bank lenders or by issuing
bonds. For an analysis of the transformations at the level of market structures banking disintermediation, see Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Shadow Banking, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN.
L. 619, 622–23 (2012); Charles K. Whitehead, The Evolution of Debt Covenants, the Credit
Market, and Corporate Governance, 34 J. CORP. L. 101, 133 (2009).
10.
For a definition of shadow banking, see Steven L. Schwarcz, supra note 9 at 620.
On the role of shadow banking in relation to banking disintermediation, see Steven. L.
Schwarcz, Banking and Financial Regulation, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND
ECON. 2, 2 (Francesco Parisi ed., 2015).
11.
See Dinis Guarda, The Cryptocurrency Economy: ICOs, Blockchain, Financial Inclusion, BITDEAL (June 16, 2017), https://blog.bitdeal.co/the-cryptocurrency-economy-icosblockchain-financial-inclusion-ceb3e7e6b871.
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12

gogo, ICOs have distinct features that render this initial comparison misguided. ICOs involve the sale of a stake in a project with the aim to raise
13
funds at an early stage of development. Although ICOs share some similarities with both IPOs and crowdfunding campaigns, they nonetheless differ from both.
In comparison with IPOs, where companies sell stocks via regulated
exchange platforms, ICOs sell digital coupons, so-called “software presale
tokens,” to early investors via non-regulated exchange platforms. The issu14
ance of tokens occurs through an indelible distributed ledger in the form of
15
16
an organization’s cryptocurrency (clones of Bitcoin, created on protocols
such as Counterparty, Ethereum, or Openledger). These tokens create the
17
capital inflow required for project finance, and can be purchased online
with fiat currency or another digital currency at a predetermined exchange
18
rate. Tokens do not generally confer ownership rights, as common stocks
available in an IPO would. Instead of the ownership right itself, a token offers a discount on cryptocurrency before it hits the exchanges but after the
ICO is launched (this may be an argument against defining them as “securi19
20
ties”), and a right to vote on future decisions. Some ICOs provide for different categories of participation (or levels of membership) such as voting
member, founding member, third party service provider member, and asset
21
gateway member.

12.
See Josh Finer, How Blockchain Startups Are Driving an Under-the-Radar Fundraising Boom, VENTUREBEAT (Nov. 13, 2016, 9:05 AM), https://venturebeat.com/2016/11/
13/how-blockchain-startups-are-driving-an-under-the-radar-fundraising-boom.
13.
Maria Fonseca, ICOs and Blockchain Token Funding, INTELLIGENTHQ (May 5,
2017), https://www.intelligenthq.com/finance/icos-and-blockchain-token-funding.
14.
The Market in Initial Coin Offerings Risks Becoming a Bubble, THE ECONOMIST
(Apr. 27, 2017), http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21721425-it-mayalso-spawn-valuable-innovations-market-initial-coin-offerings.
15.
Brandon Kostinuk, Too Many Crypto Coin Crowd Sales Could Crowd Out True
Innovators, AM. BANKER (June 29, 2016, 12:00 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/
opinion/too-many-crypto-coin-crowd-sales-could-crowd-out-true-innovators.
16.
Paul Vigna, How a Bitcoin Clone Helped a Company Raise $12 Million in 12
Minutes, WALL ST. J. (May 17, 2017, 5:49 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-a-bitcoinclone-helped-a-company-raise-12-million-in-12-minutes-1495018802.
17.
Id.
18.
Kostinuk, supra note 15.
19.
See Richard Kastelein, Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs) Can Disrupt Both
Traditional VC and Equity Crowdfunding, INTELLIGENTHQ (Mar. 31, 2017),
https://www.intelligenthq.com/finance/initial-coin-offerings-icos-can-disrupt-vc-and-equitycrowdfunding.
20.
Ben Dickson, Can You Trust Crypto-Token Crowdfunding?, TECHCRUNCH (Feb.
12, 2017, 1:00 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2017/02/12/can-you-trust-crypto-tokencrowdfunding.
21.
For example, OpenANX, a cryptocurrency exchange, provides for the following
types of investors:
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Unlike crowdfunding campaigns, ICOs cannot be purely qualified as
22
23
donations, but more generally constitute a financial stake in the company,
24
including, as mentioned above, the right to vote on future decisions.
Therefore, ICOs have a clear speculative purpose, consisting of a trade in
material value developed on platforms and cryptocurrencies, distinguishing
them from campaigns conducted on Kickstarter.
Although ICOs are a rather recent phenomenon, a structural pattern has
25
emerged. In the first stage (pre-launch), such initiatives are generally announced on cryptocurrency forums (such as Bitcoin Talk, Cryptocointalk,
and Reddit). This announcement is followed by an executive summary to
present the project to investors, which solicits specific comments on the project. These comments are considered in the subsequent drafting of an offer26
ing memorandum (in the form of a white paper), which provides more detailed information to help potential investors assess the project, including,
importantly, the key terms, investment strategy, criteria, restrictions, pro27
cesses, and returns. Whitepapers are not submitted to any authority, nor
are they required to comply with any minimum disclosure standard provided
by any authority. Thus, these preliminary steps are crucial for building general market credibility and investor trust in the soundness of the project. In

Membership provides the holder with access to the openANX platform and may
convey voting privileges and other benefits as outlined below. The memberships
will work through a tiered structure that allow for simple access, voting privileges
or commercial (read: business) solicitation of services on the platform (e.g. escrow,
legal, exchange, credit, asset gateway) with the relative number of tokens required
for redemption varying with the level of benefits.” Clause 5.2 further defines Voting membership and Founding membership. With regard to the former, it states that
“A voting member shall have the privilege to vote on decisions regarding the
openANX platform. These votes shall be determined via the Foundation’s terms
and shall be communicated to the Membership through the Foundation’s website
(www.openanx.org) and via social media and online channels.” With regard to latter, it provides that “a founding member shall have all the privileges of a voting
member. In addition, a founding member shall have the right to suggest topics for
upcoming discussions.
HUGH MADDEN ET AL., OPENANX – REAL WORLD APPLICATION OF DECENTRALIZED
EXCHANGES 18, 19 (V2.3.8 2017), https://www.oax.org/whitepapers/openANX_White_
Paper_ENU.pdf.
22.
See What is a Token Sale (ICO)?, SMITH + CROWN (June 21, 2016),
https://sci.smithandcrown.com/research/what-is-a-token-sale.
23.
Ben Dickson, What Is an Initial Coin Offering (ICO)?, TECHTALKS (Dec. 7, 2016),
https://bdtechtalks.com/2016/12/07/what-is-an-initial-coin-offering-ico.
24.
Dickson, supra note 20.
25.
In the sense of the identification of four different phases, see Roger Aitken, Investment Guide To “Crypto” Coin Offerings Rating Blockchain Startups, FORBES, (Jan. 6, 2017,
11:13
AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogeraitken/2017/01/06/investment-guide-tocrypto-coin-offerings-rating-blockchain-startups/#614e6940121b.
26.
Id.; Fonseca, supra note 13.
27.
See Fonseca, supra note 13.
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this sense, the draft of a yellow paper where the technical specificities are
provided is of paramount importance in supporting the project at this early
28
phase. In this first stage, a preliminary offer is made to selected investors.
After the signing of the offer, the launch of the ICO is announced and a PR
campaign targeting a broader segment of investors (typically including
29
small investors) begins. Next, the ICO is launched and the new venture
sells its own cryptocurrency to be used with its software, even before the
30
software is written, though the company may have a proof of concept or an
alpha version before starting the token sale, and sometimes even a beta ver31
sion as in the case of Storj. The collection of funds in Bitcoin is a common
practice and may be implemented in two ways, either by employing a public
address, allowing the participants to send Bitcoin from an address they control the private key for, or alternatively assigning to each of them a
unique/individual Bitcoin address after creating an account for each of
32
them. A best practice is to make public a multi-signature address (a specific type of digital signature allowing two or more users to sign a document as
33
a group) where all the funds are ultimately held. This round of fundraising
(usually, there is only one) occurs before the startup has launched its project. However, the duration of an ICO may vary depending on the success of
the entrepreneurial initiative among the investors: the most successful ICOs
have been concluded in a few minutes.
Lastly, digital tokens are listed on cryptocurrency exchanges for trading. At present, there are forty exchanges around the world that serve as
secondary markets where cryptocurrencies can be traded for Bitcoins in an
34
open marketplace. A cryptocurrency’s pre-ICO price is arbitrarily deter35
mined by the start-up team that structured the ICO, whereas the post-ICO
price dynamics are determined by the market supply and demand. This is
consistent with the decentralized functioning of blockchain technology,
considering that the network of participants, instead of a central authority or

28.
Aitken, supra note 25.
29.
Id.
30.
Finer, supra note 12.
31.
Trond Vidar Bjorøy, Blockchain Fundings Are Trendy, But We’re Still in the Wild
West Days, VENTUREBEAT (May 14, 2017, 4:54 PM), https://venturebeat.com/2017/05/14/
blockchain-fundings-are-trendy-but-were-still-in-the-wild-west-days.
32.
Sid Kalla, A Framework for Valuing Crypto Tokens, COINDESK (Mar. 4, 2017,
1:33 PM), https://www.coindesk.com/framework-valuing-crypto-tokens.
33.
Ben Davenport, What is Multi-Sig, and What Can It Do?, COINCENTER (Jan. 1,
2015), https://coincenter.org/entry/what-is-multi-sig-and-what-can-it-do.
34.
Tim Lea, Venture Capital 3.0: The Initial Coin Offering Explained, FINANCIAL
REVIEW (May 3, 2017, 11:00 PM), http://www.afr.com/technology/venture-capital-30-theinitial-coin-offering-explained-20170502-gvxhos.
35.
Richard Kastelein, What Initial Coin Offerings Are, and Why VC Firms Care,
HARV. BUS. REV. (Mar. 24, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/03/what-initial-coin-offerings-areand-why-vc-firms-care.
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36

government, sets the price. Successful entrepreneurial activities increase
37
the price of the tokens, granting profitable returns to investors, but the tokens’ price will fall if the start-up fails.

B. The Fragmentation of the Original Model: Recent Trends
(IICOs, Initial Supply Auctions, RICOs, SAFT,
Airdrops, and STOs)
A significant last few months has transformed the ICO market. Not38
withstanding concerns over its credibility and legitimacy, the issuance in
February 2018 of Petro by the Venezuelan government proved that ICOs
may theoretically be applied not only to entrepreneurial finance but also to
39
public finance. The (incomplete) ICO of Telegram and, even more im40
portantly, the 4 billion-dollar ICO of Block.one led to a growth in terms of
size of the ICOs, emphasizing their role as a clearer and more direct competitor to IPOs.
From a structural perspective, ICOs continue to evolve in order to optimize this method of fundraising, increasing their efficiency while correcting
41
the problems that emerge. Recently, ICOs switched from an “uncapped” to
a “capped sale” model, to then adopting the so-called “reverse Dutch auction” model (Gnosis ICOO was the first to adopt the “reverse Dutch auc42
tion”). In an uncapped sale, the quantity of tokens sold to the public is not
predetermined (as was the case with the sale of Ethereum). Criticism di43
44
rected at uncapped sales caused a shift towards “capped sales,” which

36.
Id.
37.
See The Market in Initial Coin Offerings, supra note 14; see also Charles Dearing,
Rule of Thumb For ICO Investor: Explore Risks Involved, COINTELEGRAPH (June 9, 2017)
https://cointelegraph.com/news/rule-of-thumb-for-ico-investor-explore-risks-involved.
38.
Komfie Manalo, Petro ICO Reportedly Rakes In $5B for Venezuela, CRYPTOVEST,
https://cryptovest.com/news/petro-ico-reportedly-rakes-in-5b-for-venezuela.
39.
Paul Vigna, Telegram Messaging App Scraps Plans for Public Coin Offering,
WALL ST. J. (May 2, 2018, 1:25 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/telegram-messaging-appscraps-plans-for-public-coin-offering-1525281933; see also Jon Russell & Mike Butcher, Telegram’s Billion-Dollar ICO Has Become a Mess, TECHCRUNCH (May 3, 2018, 10:34 AM),
http://techcrunch.com/2018/05/03/telegrams-billion-dollar-ico-has-become-a-mess.
40.
Kate Rooney, A Blockchain Start-Up Just Raised $4 Billion Without a Live Product, CNBC (May 31, 2018, 12:26 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/31/a-blockchain-startup-just-raised-4-billion-without-a-live-product.html.
41.
Dell’Erba, supra note 1, at 1116.
42.
Id. at 1116-17.
43.
See Vitalik Buterin, Analyzing Token Sale Models, VITALIK BUTERIN’S WEBSITE
(June 9, 2017), http://vitalik.ca/general/2017/06/09/sales.html. The author explains that “Uncapped sales” were perceived somewhat as an expression of “greed” of their promoters, and
additionally, from an investor perspective, a major concern was related to their exposure to the
“high uncertainty about the valuation” of what they were buying.
44.
Id.
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emerged as the dominant structure between 2016 and 2017. This paragraph
provides an analysis of the different ICO structures emerging from practice.

1. Interactive Initial Coin Offering (“IICO”)
The Interactive Initial Coin Offering (“IICO”) was first proposed by Vi45
talik Buterin, Jason Teutsch, and Christopher Brown to make token sales
more egalitarian for large and small buyers in an effort to design a more fair
46
model of ICO by preventing “the sort of FOMO and gas wars that can result in whales getting all the tokens and squeezing out investors of humbler
47
means.” IICOs were qualified as “interactive” because contributors may
opt to enter and exit the crowdsale based on the behaviors of other partici48
49
pants, leading to a valuation equilibrium.
50
Kleros is an example of a blockchain start-up implementing an IICO.
As Buterin emphasized, “No token crowdsale satisfies that both: (i) a fixed
amount of currency buys at least a fixed fraction of the total tokens, and (ii)
51
everyone can participate.” IICOs promise to level the playing field between small and large investors, distinguishing IICOs from capped and un52
capped sales. Uncapped token sales have extremely high uncertainty in
53
their valuation, due to the unknown total available supply. Therefore, it
may be extremely difficult to quantify the value of an individual token in
54
relation to the total. On the other hand, capped token sales make participation harder due to the risk that token sales may be “oversubscribed, and so
55
there is a large incentive to getting in first.”
IICOs promise to improve the certainty of participation because a contributor may select a personal cap that is high enough and be sure to partici-

45.
Jason Teutsch, Vitalik Buterin & Christopher Brown, Interactive Coin Offerings
(Dec. 11, 2017), https://people.cs.uchicago.edu/~teutsch/papers/ico.pdf.
46.
Federico Ast, Kleros Token Sale: Frequently Asked Questions, MEDIUM
(May 7, 2018), https://medium.com/kleros/kleros-token-sale-frequently-asked-questionscf56359fd624.
47.
Kai Sedgwick, Six Alternatives to an Initial Coin Offering, BITCOIN.COM (June 18,
2018), https://news.bitcoin.com/six-alternatives-to-an-initial-coin-offering. The author refers
to the example of Fantom: “In Fantom’s recent crowdsale, for example, one investor spent
580k gwei, or around $24,000, just to ensure their transaction reached the front of the queue.”
Id.
48.
Federico Ast, How Interactive Coin Offerings (IICOs) Work, MEDIUM (Apr. 23,
2018), https://medium.com/kleros/how-interactive-coin-offerings-iicos-work-beed401ce526.
49.
Id.
50.
KLEROS, https://kleros.io (last visited Jan. 25, 2020).
51.
Teutsch, Buterin & Brown, supra note 45, at 2.
52.
Ast, supra note 48.
53.
Buterin, supra note 43.
54.
Jeff Benson, Building A Better Coin Offering: Lessons From Kleros’ Interactive
ICO, BITCOIN ISLE (July 30, 2018), https://www.bitcoinisle.com/2018/07/30/building-abetter-coin-offering-lessons-from-kleros-interactive-ico.
55.
Buterin, supra note 43.
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pate in the IICO. Further, IICOs promise to improve the certainty of valuation: the personal cap gives contributors “the control over the valuation” at
56
which the contributor decides to enter the sale. IICOs are structured in
three steps. Although IICOs aim to reduce the valuation risks, this model
does not entirely eliminate the risk for first contributors entering the
crowdsale, who do this with almost no information available on the success
of the sale. To create a liquid market, IICOs implement a “bonus structure”
or “inflation ramp” to reduce inertia while encouraging formation of a liquid
57
market. The bonus structure creates an incentive for early participants to
buy tokens, who then have the right to opt-out and be refunded without pay58
ing any penalty; therefore, the earlier a buyer participates, the more pur59
chasing power she gets. Such bonus structure is equal to 20% for first
stage participants, and follows a linear decrease “down to 10% at the beginning of the withdrawal lock” by the start of the second phase, and down to
60
0% by the end of the crowdsale. The second stage, known as the “partial
withdrawal stage,” grants contributors the right to partially withdraw their
61
bid. In the third stage, the “withdrawal lock stage,” contributors cannot
voluntarily withdraw their bids. However, new participants may still join the
IICO under the condition that their cap is aligned with the current valua62
tion. During this phase, automatic withdrawals are implemented on every
block, and contributors who provided the lowest personal caps are withdrawn first, and partial and equal withdrawals are made in the case of tied
63
personal caps. IICOs conclude with a final valuation, with a split of tokens
between buyers who remained in the sale, in line with their contribution and
64
their bonus.

56.
Id.
57.
Ast, supra note 48.
58.
Id.
59.
Id.
60.
Teutsch, Buterin & Brown, supra note 45.
61.
Ast, supra note 48. As the author explains: “Alice, Bob, and Carl all placed their
contributions during the first phase. Their combined contributions result in a project valuation
of 21 ETH. After Seeing the project valuation, Carl decides to withdraw. After Carl is refunded, the valuation is now at 20 ETH. But wait! If Carl was contributing 5 ETH and has opted
out, why isn’t the valuation at 16 ETH? In order to avoid blackout attacks[], the IICO penalize
manual withdrawals. The penalty is a combination between a partial lock-in and a bonus slash
on that lock-in. In this case, Carl contributed 5 ETH at a moment when the bonus was 18%.
He will only be able to withdraw a part of that depending on the moment when he does it.
Let’s say Carl withdraws manually 80% of the way through the end of the second phase. This
means he can only withdraw 20% (1 ETH) of his 5 ETH contribution. The other 80% (4 ETH)
stays locked in the sale and has its bonus reduced by S (this cancels out the advantage over
the other participants). This means he now has a contribution of 4 ETH and a bonus of 12%.”
62.
Id.
63.
Id.
64.
Id.
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2. Initial Supply Auction
The “Initial Supply Auction” constitutes a further experiment to improve the ICO model. In June 2018, the Metronome Project implemented an
ICO based on a falling price auction. The team described this model of ICO
in the following terms:
The Initial Supply Auction utilizes a descending price auction,
where the price starts intentionally high and ticks down incrementally toward its intentionally low price floor as long as the auction
is open. The price is not averaged out. Purchasers will receive their
Metronome almost immediately after purchase, at the price they
purchased. Purchasers should purchase only when they feel the
65
price of MET to be fair.
The Initial Supply Auction raised concerns and critiques by users, in
66
particular related to gas prices, faulty wallets, and auction manipulations.

3. Simple Agreement for Tokens (“SAFT”)
The so-called Simple Agreement for Tokens (“SAFT”), modeled after
Simple Agreement for Equity (“SAFE”), was one of the first attempts to
improve the mechanism of ICOs. First, the SAFT sought to create an inter67
national formal framework for token sales; further, it aimed at “separat[ing] the pre-functional sale and the underlying consumer token, new fi68
nancing instruments.” The original proposal, “The SAFT Project: Toward
69
a Compliant Token Sale Framework,” was based on four steps. First, developers publish a whitepaper and incorporate a Delaware corporation, securing commitments exclusively from accredited investors with whom they
enter into a SAFT (benefitting the exemption of Rule 506(c) of Regulation
D of the Securities Act). Second, accredited investors transfer funds to the
corporation, which may benefit from a discount on the final token sale,
which counts as a security. Next, developers have a disclosure duty, filing a
Form D with the SEC disclosing the sale. The corporation is in the position
to develop the network into a product that provides genuine utility to its us-

65.
Sedgwick, supra note 47.
66.
Christine Masters, The Metronome Project by Jeff Garzik Launched with a Faulty
Auction, CRYPTOVEST (June 25, 2018), https://cryptovest.com/news/the-metronome-projectby-jeff-garzik-launched-with-a-faulty-auction.
67.
See Dirk A. Zetzsche et al., The ICO Gold Rush: It’s a Scam, It’s a Bubble, It’s a
Super Challenge for Regulators, 60 HARV. INT’L L.J. 267 (2019).
68.
David L. Concannon et al., The Yellow Brick Road for Consumer Tokens: The Path
to SEC and CFTC Compliance, in GLOB. LEGAL INSIGHTS, BLOCKCHAIN &
CRYPTOCURRENCY REGULATION 103 (Josias Dewey ed., 2019).
69.
Juan Batiz-Benet et al., The SAFT Project: Toward a Compliant Token Sale
Framework
(2017),
https://www.cooley.com/~/media/cooley/pdf/reprints/saft-projectwhitepaper.ashx.
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ers and can finally launch the network and deliver the tokens to the investors, who may opt for selling the token to the public, either directly or
through exchanges. However, “The SAFT Project” did not solve the criticalities that emerged in traditional ICOs, and in particular was not successful in
reducing the costs deriving from the potential application of the federal securities laws.

4. Airdrops
One of the most debated evolutions is “airdrops,” a scheme representing
70
a minority of ICOs. Airdrops consist of the free of charge distribution of
cryptocurrency tokens by cryptocurrency ventures (both startups as well as
established blockchain-based enterprises such as cryptocurrency exchange
71
platforms and wallet services) to the wallets of users. Developers may decide to “send a small amount to a population of Ethereum wallets in order to
spread the word” for marketing reasons and to increase the value of their
72
tokens. By distributing tokens for free to members of their community to
encourage the token’s adoption and usage, developers hope to increase de73
mand, and thus the value, of the token. While startups generally opt for
pre-airdrop announcements in order to heighten interest around the project,
74
established blockchain-based enterprises prefer not to announce them.
75
However, tokens cannot be distributed until the end of the token sale, and
are generally distributed to community members of the ICO project who
were engaged with the development of the community. Their engagement is
measured through specific parameters, including the consistency and quality
of the contribution to topics related to the project, and the duration of the
community membership (with older members having priority over newer
76
ones).

5. Security Token Offering (“STO”)
The urgent need to prevent additional fraudulent schemes ,which have
already plagued the ICO market, has led to the creation of what may be considered the next step in the evolution of ICOs: Securities Token Offerings
(“STOs”). STOs address the need to create a safer environment for entre70.
See Howell, Niessner & Yermack, supra note 7.
71.
Katalyse.io, What Are “Airdrops” in Crypto World?, MEDIUM (Feb. 15, 2018),
https://medium.com/the-mission/what-are-airdrops-in-crypto-world-a345725c75e0.
72.
Kenny Li, WTF Is an Airdrop? A Detailed Guide to Free Cryptocurrency,
HACKERNOON (Feb. 25, 2018) https://hackernoon.com/wtf-is-an-airdrop-a-detailed-guide-tofree-cryptocurrency-e70e8777dd83.
73.
Emmanuel Darko, What Are ICO Air Drops and Where to Find Them, ICO WATCH
LIST (Mar. 7, 2018), https://icowatchlist.com/blog/ico-air-drops-find.
74.
See id.
75.
Li, supra note 72.
76.
Darko, supra note 73.
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preneurs and investors. Like an ICO, STO tokens can be purchased during
77
the offering and may be traded, sold, or held. However, while in the context
of an ICO, coins or tokens (and generally “utility tokens”) may be backed
78
even by an abstract idea, but a security token must be backed by something
79
tangible, including assets, profits, or revenue of the company.
STOs have been described as safer than ICOs, a sort of “fully regulated
80
81
ICO,” or an “IPO lite.” In fact, STOs comply with securities regulations
82
such as Reg D, Reg S, and Reg A+. Furthermore, tokens released “are intended to be compliant with KYC/AML requirements, and securities laws in
83
whatever jurisdictions they touch.” Together with regulatory compliance, a
further source of increased safety of STOs is the issuance process. Overall,
84
STOs are considered harder to put in place when compared to ICOs. Companies need to revise their books with regularity, and a Reg A+ offering re85
quires 2 years of audited financials. In addition, an underwriter as well as
an investment banker are required, due to the risks connected to selling un86
registered securities. For these reasons, STOs may be safer than ICOs—
with lesser chance of fraud and greater ability to protect investors from so87
called “pump-and-dump” schemes that can occur in ICOs —since they can

77.
Polymath, What Is a Security Token Offering (STO)?, POLYMATH NETWORK (Mar.
12, 2018), https://blog.polymath.network/what-is-a-security-token-offering-sto-4e5a92bf6bca.
78.
See Rooney, supra note 40.
79.
E.g., Polymath, supra note 77; Michael Michaelides, Blockchain and ICO
FAQs, MEDIUM (Sept. 6, 2018), https://medium.com/bdxalliance/blockchain-and-ico-faqs350482b3950d (“If a crypto token derives its value from an external, tradable asset, it is classified as a security token and thus becomes subject to federal securities regulations. Failure to
abide by these regulations could result in costly penalties and could threaten to derail a project. However, if a startup meets all its regulatory obligations, the security token classification
creates the potential for a wide variety of applications, the most promising of which is the
ability to issue tokens that represent shares of company stock.”).
80.
See Sedgwick, supra note 47; Michael K. Spencer, Security Token Offerings—
STOs Are the New ICOs, MARKETKAPS (Oct. 2018), https://marketkaps.com/en/2018/10/30/
security-token-offerings%E2%80%8A-%E2%80%8Astos-are-the-new-icos.
81.
Patrick Tan, Security Tokens Versus Stablecoins, MEDIUM (Sept. 27, 2018),
https://medium.com/predict/security-tokens-versus-stablecoins-2d33b91e2fd.
82.
Iliya Zaki, Security Token Offerings (STOs)—What You Need To Know,
HACKERNOON (Dec. 28, 2018), https://hackernoon.com/security-token-offerings-stos-whatyou-need-to-know-8628574d11e2.
83.
Polymath, supra note 77.
84.
Christina Comben, Here’s Why Blockchain Companies Are Moving Away from
ICOs, THE MERKLE (May 5, 2018), https://themerkle.com/heres-why-blockchain-companiesare-moving-away-from-icos.
85.
Id.
86.
Id.
87.
This form of manipulation has been a matter of growing concern in unregulated
cryptocurrency markets. See Rick D., Pump and Dump Schemes Encourage Traders to Play a
Game of Financial Chicken, NEWSBTC (Aug. 6, 2018), https://www.newsbtc.com/2018/08/06/
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provide investors with “reassurance from the get-go that they won’t run into
88
problems down the line.” Polymath emphasized that security tokens created through its protocol (Polymath’s ST-20 standard) can “prevent trade between excluded persons through the use of robust smart contracts and our
89
address whitelisting technology.” Further, it emphasizes that “[w]hen companies release their Security Token Offerings on the Polymath platform, they
will have been guided through the complex legal and technological processes
90
before issuance.” In addition, companies such as Polymath and Harbor are
engaged in developing restrictive standards, and only fully compliant ex91
changes such as Templum are operating within this market.

6. Reversible ICO (“RICO”)
The newest ICO model is the “reversible ICO” (“RICO”). It is also intended to decrease risks for investors in fraudulent ICOs. This ICO model is
based on the possibility for investors “to return their tokens – and be reim92
bursed – at any stage of the project, via a special-purpose smart contract.”
Once investors return their tokens, other investors may re-purchase them.
Although this mechanism may incentivize ICO issuers to fulfill their obliga93
tions, it may also increase instability. The startup is constantly subject to
potential withdrawal of the funds by investors, therefore it cannot rely on
94
having a specific amount of money as it plans the next steps of the project.
With a traditional equity security, if the investor changes his mind, he can
sell it to another buyer (assuring liquidity), but not back to the issuer.

II. THE ROLE OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
A. The “Do No Harm” Approach: CFTC vs. SEC
The relationship between entrepreneurship and innovation is not the
“happiest,” as SEC Commissioner Hester M. Pierce noted in a recent

ing Them, Costing Others Millions, WALL. ST. J. (Aug. 5, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/
graphics/cryptocurrency-schemes-generate-big-coin.
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Polymath, supra note 77.
90.
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Nabil Charania, The Era of Security Tokens has Begun, VENTUREBEAT (Aug. 4,
2018), https://venturebeat.com/2018/08/04/the-era-of-security-tokens-has-begun.
92.
Helen Partz, ERC-20 Co-Author Proposes New ICO Model to Protect Investors
from Fraudulent Token Sales, COINTELEGRAPH (Oct. 31, 2018), https://cointelegraph.com/
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93.
Id.
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See Solomon Sunny, Devcon 2018: Co-Author of ERC-20 Token Standard Proposes a Safer ICO Model, SMARTEREUM (Nov. 1, 2018), https://smartereum.com/40056/devcon2018-co-author-of-erc-20-token-standard-proposes-a-safer-ico-model.
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95

speech. As Commissioner Pierce explained, regulators, entrepreneurs and
society have three different points view:
Regulators get used to dealing with the existing players in an industry, and those players tend to have teams of people dedicated to
dealing with regulators. Entrepreneurs trying to start something
new are often much more focused on that new thing than on how it
fits into a regulator’s dog-eared rulebook. Regulators, for their part,
tend to be skeptical of change because its consequences are difficult
to foresee and figuring out how it fits into existing regulatory
frameworks is difficult. Society, however, often pushes regulators
to accept change. After all, society benefits from entrepreneurs’
imaginative approaches to solving problems and willingness to go
out on a limb with a new idea. Society welcomes innovations that
96
make our lives easier, more enjoyable, and more productive.
As Commissioner Pierce correctly notes, the financial industry is an exception, with entrepreneurship and innovation not always as welcome as in
97
other fields. However, technological progress in the financial industry operates exactly as it does in any other industry or social activity and is characterized by “the same mix of hope, promise, and risk that technological
98
progress in other parts of our society offers.” Regulators in general are in
the position to “allow innovation to proceed,” while implementing “reason99
able safeguards and watching for unanticipated consequences.” Financial
regulators specifically are in charge of regulating an industry representing a
crucial node for the society, capable of bringing “progress and productivity
100
in the rest of the economy.”
Different interests and rationales support the decision to issue new regulation. While new regulation may pursue public interest objectives, i.e., legal certainty, investor protection, and financial stability, it is not necessarily
the best choice. Regulated entities may have interests in the issuance of new
regulations that may create barriers to entry and frustrate competition. Furthermore, new regulation might create significant costs. Increased compliance costs particularly affect new competitors. Furthermore, costs connected
to so-called “rent-seeking” lead to the investment of a significant amount of
resources by regulated firms to influence regulators and obtain privileges

95.
Hester M. Peirce, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at Protecting the Public While Fostering Innovation and Entrepreneurship: First Principles for Optimal Regulation
at the University of Missouri School of Law (Feb. 8, 2019) (transcript available at
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101

instead of creating value for customers. In addition, by exercising downward pressure on the regulators, the firms overseen by regulators may harm
the reputation of the regulator: the result may be the adoption of a regulation
that does not maximize the public interest, but rather exists primarily to pro102
tect the agency from criticism for inaction. For example, banking entities,
in particular investment banks, have an interest in blocking a wide adoption
of ICOs, since IPOs are a source of massive fees for them. A similar interest
may drive alternative funds, such as venture capital, which may be massively
103
disrupted by ICOs in the financing of early stage companies.
At the beginning of the Internet era, American regulators proposed a
“do no harm” approach (together with four other key principles) due to the
104
risk that regulation could frustrate and impede innovation. The Framework for Global Electronic Commerce adopted by the Clinton administration in 1997 certainly implemented this view. It recognized that an increased
share of transactions took place online and that the Internet would revolu105
tionize retail and direct marketing. At that time, the regulation of the Internet required a balanced approach different from both “laissez faire” and
“knee-jerk regulation.” It was important not to make the mistake of applying
an old economy policy framework or, on the other extreme, expecting the
development of the Internet without any guidance and framework, pursuing
the importance of building market confidence (especially with regard to ecommerce) while not suffocating the potential exponential development of
106
the Internet.
Initially, regulatory authorities did not directly address the issue of
ICOs. Rather, they referred to blockchain more generally. Particularly relevant in such a context is the position of the CFTC. The CFTC Chairman
Christopher Giancarlo compared the blockchain technology to the Internet
revolution and supported a “do no harm” approach in regulating blockchain
technology. Giancarlo’s speech provides a definition of the “do no harm”
approach:

101.
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103.
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104.
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105.
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106.
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Governments and regulators should avoid undue restrictions, support a predictable, consistent and simple legal environment and respect the “bottom-up” nature of the technology and its development
in a global marketplace. This model is well-recognized as the enlightened regulatory underpinning of the Internet that brought about
107
profound changes to human society.
The CFTC opined that this approach should be re-applied to blockchain. A successful precedent was the implementation of the “do no harm”
approach at the time of the Internet transformation. In response to Internet
technology, the American administration adopted the Telecommunications
Act of 1996 and the subsequent “Framework for Global Electric Commerce.” The “do no harm” approach was a catalyst that allowed the United
States to play a prominent role in technology innovation, generating unprecedented investment in innovation equal to $90 billion, investing in the crosscontinental fiber-optic broadband network, and eventually allowing the
United States to become the undisputed global leader in the field. In this
context, the private sector played a primary role, without any interference
from federal or state law. This led Giancarlo to qualify the “do no harm”
approach as “unquestionably the right approach to development of the Internet,” as well as “the right overarching approach for distributed ledger
108
technology.” This may be justified by the significant similarities that the
Internet Era shares with the development of blockchain technology, since
they are both disruptors and moving targets.
Giancarlo further emphasized the potential role of regulation in frustrating innovation: “[I]nnovators and investors should not have to seek government’s permission, only its forbearance, to develop DLT so they can do
the work necessary to address the increased operational complexity and cap109
ital consumption of modern financial market regulation.” Giancarlo argued that regulators should opt for the provision of “uniform principles,”
110
beneficial for investments in DLT and innovation. Consistent with the
regulatory approach adopted in the Internet era, regulators should not impede innovation and investments in DLT, but instead “provide a predictable,
consistent and straightforward legal environment,” avoiding “regulatory un111
certainty or an uncoordinated regulatory approach.” All these considerations can be safely extended to the specific issue of ICOs, as part of the
broader process of innovation implemented through blockchain. ICOs are

107.
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clearly connected to crypto-currencies; the launch of new ICOs implies the
creation of new crypto-currencies.
In October 2017, after the SEC had issued the “Report of Investigation
Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: The
112
DAO” (“DAO Report”) and strengthened its enforcement action, the
CFTC followed a similar path by issuing a report indicating it was open to
the possibility that virtual currencies and virtual tokens may trigger different
regulation. In its document, the CFTC took the position that the potential
qualification of ICO tokens as securities would not be inconsistent with the
CFTC’s “determination that virtual currencies are commodities and that virtual tokens may be commodities or derivatives contracts depending on the
113
particular facts and circumstances.” Similar to the definition of “security,”
the definition of “commodity” is very broad, encompassing a wide range of
products, such as physical commodities, like agricultural products or natural
resources, as well currencies or interest rates. Further, the definition of
“commodity” encompasses “all services, rights, and interests . . . in which
114
contracts for future delivery are presently or in the future dealt in.”
Since 2014, former CFTC Chairman Timothy Massad has adhered to
the position that the agency can have jurisdiction over Bitcoin and more
generally over virtual currencies, depending “on the facts and circumstances
pertaining to any particular activity in question,” and he has stated that derivative contracts based on a virtual currency represented “one area within
115
116
our responsibility.” Coinflip introduced a new era of “Bitcoin” as a
commodity, with the CFTC order stating that the Commodities Exchange
Act (“CEA”) covers “all services, rights, and interests in which contracts for
future delivery are presently or in the future dealt in,” and further stating
that Bitcoin and other virtual currencies are encompassed in the definition

112.
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117

and properly defined as commodities.” The CFTC charged Coinflip with
118
119
the violation of Sections 4c(b) and 5h(a)(l) of the CEA by “conducting
activity related to commodity options contrary to Commission Regulations
and by operating a facility for the trading or processing of swaps without
being registered as a swap execution facility or designated contract mar120
ket.” Specifically, Coinflip “operated an online facility named Derivabit,
121
offering to connect buyers and sellers of Bitcoin option contracts.”
In contrast to the CFTC, the SEC waited a long time before taking any
position with regards to ICOs and cryptocurrencies and has never explicitly
articulated a “do no harm” approach. However, it may be argued that the
agency has tacitly implemented such an approach. In fact, the SEC took a
long time to make any public statement and to bring enforcement actions
against ICOs and cryptocurrencies. The first public statement specifically
impacting ICOs came in July 2017 in the form of a DAO Report, which
opened a new era of full regulatory enforcement. SEC Chairman Jay Clayton clarified this when he “instructed the SEC staff to be on high alert for
approaches to ICOs that may be contrary to the spirit of our securities laws
122
and the professional obligations of the U.S. securities bar.”

B. Shifting From Inactivity to Full Enforcement
1. The Stages of Intervention
Although the SEC has never explicitly mentioned the “do no harm” approach, it has held off on taking any public position towards ICOs and cryptocurrencies, including the publication of informational statements on the
risks connected to ICOs. The identification of the main issues connected to
ICOs was a gradual process at the SEC. Certainly the creation of the Distributed Ledger Technology Working Group within the SEC was a first step,
which was instrumental in developing a deeper understanding of the phenomenon and the risks connected to blockchain. In addition, the Working
Group contributed to coordinated efforts between the different divisions and
117.
Id.
118.
Section 4c(b) of CEA makes it unlawful for any person to “offer to enter into, enter
into or confirm the execution of, any transaction involving any commodity . . . which is of the
character of, or is commonly known to the trade as, an ‘option’ . . ., ‘bid,’ ‘offer,’ ‘put,’ [or]
‘call’ . . . contrary to any rule, regulation, or order of the Commission prohibiting any such
transaction.” 7 U.S.C. § 6c(b) (2018).
119.
Section 5h(a)(1) of the Act forbids any person from operating “a facility for the
trading or processing of swaps unless the facility is registered as a swap execution facility or
as a designated contract market.” 7 U.S.C. § 7b-3(a)(1) (2018).
120.
In re Coinflip, Inc., 2015 WL 5535736, at *2.
121.
Id.
122.
Jay Clayton, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Opening Remarks at the Securities
Regulation Institute (Jan. 22, 2018), (transcript available at https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
speech-clayton-012218).
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offices within the Commission. The creation of the Cyber Unit within the
Enforcement Division of the SEC further demonstrates the intention of the
SEC to fully enforce federal securities law in the cryptospace, due to the
risks for both investors and market integrity emerging from virtual currency
123
and blockchain technology. The recent creation of the Strategic Hub for
Innovation and Financial Technology (“Finhub”) served to grant “meetings
and other assistance relating to FinTech issues arising under the federal se124
curities laws,” as the SEC explained. Finhub is a new portal, launched in
October 2018, that should allow fintech entrepreneurs to create compliant
platforms before the launch of their project, with efficiency benefits for both
125
good faith entrepreneurs and the SEC. These institutional improvements
emphasize the role that technology is currently playing in reshaping the
governance of regulatory agencies.
The shift from inactivity to enforcement was gradual. Starting in 2017,
the SEC became increasingly active with regard to cryptocurrencies. In
March 2017, the SEC denied the authorization to the Winklevoss Bitcoin
126
Exchange Traded Fund (“ETF”). The creators intended the Bitcoin ETF to
be a common stock fund pegged to the price of Bitcoin, and it would have
127
allowed investors to purchase Bitcoin without creating a personal wallet.
In rejecting the application, the SEC reasoned that the proposed fund was
128
susceptible to fraud because of the unregulated nature of Bitcoin, dismissing the proposed rule change that would have allowed the listing of the
129
shares of the Winklevoss Bitcoin Trust. The SEC’s decision demonstrated
its distrust towards the crypto asset class as a whole, especially funds attempting to trade digital currencies, and it foreshadowed future decisions

123.
Stephanie Avakian, Co-Director, Division of Enforcement, The SEC Enforcement
Division’s Initiatives Regarding Retail Investor Protection and Cybersecurity (Oct. 26, 2017),
(transcript available at https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech-avakian-2017-10-26).
124.
Request Form for FinTech-Related Meetings and Other Assistance, SEC. & EXCH.
COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/finhub-form#no-back (last visited Feb. 7, 2020).
125.
See Michael Del Castillo, SEC Launches Fintech Hub to Engage with Cryptocurrency Startups and More, FORBES (Oct. 18, 2018, 2:39 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
michaeldelcastillo/2018/10/18/sec-launches-fintech-hub-to-engage-with-cryptocurrencystartups-and-more/amp/?__twitter_impression=true.
126.
See Order Disapproving a Proposed Rule Change, Exchange Act Release No. 3480206, at 2 (Mar. 10, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/batsbzx/2017/34-80206.pdf. The
SEC disapproved the proposed rule change that would have allowed the listing of the shares
of the Winklevoss Bitcoin Trust.
127.
Russell Brandom, The SEC Just Handed Bitcoin a Huge Setback, VERGE (Mar. 10,
2017, 4:10 PM), http://www.theverge.com/2017/3/10/14883350/sec-bitcoin-etf-orderwinklevoss-denied.
128.
See Order Disapproving a Proposed Rule Change, Exchange Act Release No. 3480206, at 21 (Mar. 10, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/batsbzx/2017/34-80206.pdf.
129.
Id. at 2.
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130

disregarding ICOs as a non-regulated framework. On subsequent occasions, the SEC confirmed the view expressed in the March 2017 Disapproval Order. On July 26, 2018 the SEC confirmed its July 2018 Disapproval
131
Order, in its response to the Winklevosses’ petition for review of the
March 2017 Disapproval Order. The SEC provided a consistent view with
the March 2017 Disapproval Order, confirming its concerns about the
bitcoin spot markets. The same risks of fraud and manipulation led the SEC
132
to reject nine proposed ETFs backed by bitcoin future contracts, highlighting concerns related to the exchanges where such ETFs would have
133
been listed
After the debate on Bitcoin ETFs approval, clearly identifiable steps
opened the season of the SEC enforcement strategy in cryptocurrencies.
First, in July 2017, the SEC issued the DAO Report, which categorized
ICOs as securities and applied securities laws to them. Second, in October
and December 2017, the SEC defined “security” with regard to ICOs, going
beyond the semantics of phrases used in offering documents such as “initial
membership offer” and “utility token,” as evidenced in the REcoin and
Munchee cases. Third, in January 2018, the SEC advocated for more collaboration with “market professionals, and especially gatekeepers,” who
have a duty to act responsibly and in accordance with the highest standards.
Fourth, in March 2018, the SEC considered the infrastructure supporting
ICOs, tokens, and cryptocurrencies; if coins and tokens are securities, the
platforms for trading them may be subject to the securities laws applicable
to exchanges. This was exemplified by the enforcement action against
EtherDelta in November 2018 for being an unregistered digital token exchange. Furthermore, the recent creation of FinHub and the SEC’s commitment to a “path to compliance” expressed in two recent cases, In the Matter
of Carriereq, Inc., d/b/a Airfox and In the Matter of Paragon Coin Inc., may
have opened an era of enhanced collaboration between the agency and market participants. In this environment, market participants can benefit from
prior guidance provided by FinHub and opportunities to comply with the

130.
See Wulf A. Kaal & Marco Dell’Erba, Blockchain Innovation in Private Investment
Funds - A Comparative Analysis of the United States and Europe (U of St. Thomas (Minnesota) Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 17-20, 2017).
131.
Order Setting Aside Action by Delegated Authority & Disapproving a Proposed
Rule Change, Exchange Act Release No. 34-83723, at 5 (Jul. 26, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/
rules/other/2018/34-83723.pdf.
132.
Paul Vigna & Asjylyn Loder, SEC Rejects Nine Proposed Bitcoin ExchangeTraded Funds, WALL STREET J. (Aug. 22, 2018, 9:43 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/secrejects-nine-proposed-bitcoin-exchange-traded-funds-1534978380.
133.
See Order Disapproving a Proposed Rule Change to List and Trade the Shares of
the ProShares Bitcoin ETF and the ProShares Short Bitcoin ETF, Exchange Act Release No.
34-83904, at 2–3 (Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nysearca/2018/3483904.pdf.
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securities laws after a breach. The following paragraphs will consider this
evolution.

2. First Stage: The DAO Report and ICO Tokens as Securities
After the rejection of the Winklevoss ETF, the SEC issued the DAO
134
Report in July 2017. It was a stepping stone in the SEC’s identification of
a more structured regulatory framework for ICOs by characterizing ICO tokens as securities under the Securities Exchange Act. In the DAO Report,
the SEC suggested the adoption of a case by case approach, considering that
“[w]hether a particular investment transaction involves the offer or sale of a
security – regardless of the terminology or technology used – will depend
on the facts and circumstances, including the economic realities of the
135
transaction.” The SEC stated that the characterization of ICOs’ tokens as
securities should be made taking into account the constitutive elements of
the investment contract by applying the so-called Howey test, a four-prong
136
test based on the following parameters: “investment of money,” “common
enterprise,” “expectation of profits,” and “[profits] to come solely from the
137
efforts of the promoter or a third party.” The Howey test proved to be a
useful tool, due to its incorporation of “a flexible rather than a static principle, one that is capable of adaptation to meet the countless and variable
schemes devised by those who seek the use of the money of others on the
138
promise of profits.” An immediate consequence of this extension of securities regulation to ICO tokens was that after requesting information from
the SEC, a blockchain-based startup (Protostarr) opted to cancel its ICO and
139
consequentially refunded its investors.

134.
SEC, Release No. 81207 - Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934: The DAO (Jul. 25, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/
investreport/34-81207.pdf.
135.
See id.
136.
Similar to the SEC, the Canadian Security Administration adopted a four-prong
test. See CSA Staff Notice 46-307: Cryptocurrency Offerings (2017), 40 O.S.C. Bull. 7231
(Can. Sec. Admin.), http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Securities-Category4/csa_
20170824_cryptocurrency-offerings.pdf.
137.
Scholars tend to separate the “expectation of profits” from the “efforts of the promoter or a third party.” See Ronald J. Coffey, The Economic Realities of a “Security”: Is
There a More Meaningful Formula?, 18 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 367, 373 (1966).
138.
SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946).
139.
See Laura Shin, After Contact By SEC, Protostarr Token Shuts Down Post-ICO,
Will Refund Investors, FORBES (Sept. 1, 2017, 2:19 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
laurashin/2017/09/01/after-contact-by-sec-protostarr-token-shuts-down-post-ico-will-refundinvestors/#2e23421d192e.
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3. Second Stage: Going Beyond the Semantics of
Phrases in the REcoin and Munchee Cases
In October 2017, the SEC brought an emergency action to charge REcoin and DRC (Diamond Reserve Club), two ICOs launched by Maksim
140
Zaslavskiy, with violating securities law. This decision is particularly relevant because of the interpretation of the semantics that the SEC used, not
formalistically but strictly connected to the economic reality of the underlying offer. In the whitepaper and on the website of REcoin, Zaslavskiy did
not refer to the terms “ICO” or “securities,” adopting instead the semantics
141
of “Initial Membership Offering” (“IMO”). The complaints stated: “In an
attempt to skirt the registration requirements of the federal securities laws,
Defendants Zaslavskiy and Diamond have refashioned the sale of the purported Diamond interests as sales of “memberships in a club,” and the Diamond ICO as an “Initial Membership Offering” or “IMO.” In reality, the
supposed “memberships” are in all material respects identical to the ownership attributes of purchasing the purported (but, indeed, non-existent) “tokens” or “coins” and are securities within the meaning of the securities
142
laws.” In a Facebook post, REcoin stated that an IMO is different from an
143
ICO or an IPO. However, the SEC concluded that such a distinction was
144
“a sham,” and REcoin certainly represented a case of “illegal unregistered
securities offerings and ongoing fraudulent conduct and misstatements designed to deceive investors in connection with the sale of securities in so145
called ‘Initial Coin Offerings.’”
The SEC confirmed this analysis in its December 2017 review of
Munchee. The SEC stated that the offering of digital tokens to investors by
a blockchain-based food review services company (Munchee) constituted an
146
illegal unregistered securities offering. In particular, the SEC challenged
the view proposed by Munchee that the ICO tokens were “utility tokens”
instead of “securities tokens.” The SEC took the view that although such
tokens had a practical use at the time of the offering, this would not pre-

140.
Regarding REcoin, Zaslavskyiy did not hire any professionals contrary to what he
stated, and in addition, misrepresented the effective amount he raised, declaring an amount
between 2 and 4 million dollars, instead of approximately 300,000 dollars in reality. With regard to DRC, Zaslavskiy bragged about non-existent relationships with diamond wholesalers
that, through an arbitrage process, should have provided significant gains for his investors. See
Zetzsche et al., supra note 67, at 269 n.8.
141.
Complaint at 7-8, United States v. Zaslavskiy, 2018 WL 4346339 at *2 (E.D.N.Y
2018) (No. 17. Civ. 647).
142.
Id. at *8.
143.
Id. at *63.
144.
Id. at *64.
145.
Id. at *1.
146.
In re Munchee Inc., Securities Act Release No. 10445 at 36-38, File No. 3-18304
(SEC Dec. 11, 2017) (order).
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147

clude the tokens from being construed as securities. In its analysis, the
SEC highlighted the relevance of “the economic realities underlying a trans148
action.” Because of these underlying realties, the SEC ordered Munchee
149
to cease and desist pursuant to Section 8A of the Securities Act. The same
day, SEC Chairman Clayton issued a statement on the risks of fraud and
manipulation connected to ICOs (none of which registered with SEC), invit150
ing investors to actively obtain information before deciding to invest.
The same extensive interpretation of ICO tokens as securities can be
seen in the more recent case of In re Tomahawk Exploration LLC. In this
case, the SEC confirmed that airdrops can also represent the sale of a securi151
ty. Namely, distribution of securities in the form of tokens for promotional services serves two purposes, i.e. the function of advancing the issuer’s
economic objectives or creating a public market for the securities. According to the SEC, this distribution falls within Section 5 of the Securities Act,
152
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, and Rule 10b-5. This is consistent
with SEC conclusions reached in relation to the free distribution of stocks in
153
the 1990s. These cases had the offering of a free instrument through a
website in common, although the proponents never filed a registration
statement, and no Form D was filed on the basis of an exemption from registration requirements of Section 5 of the Securities Exchange Act.
The two most recent cases, In re Carriereq, Inc., d/b/a AirFox (Air154
155
Fox), and In re Paragon Coin Inc., opened a new, more collaborative
way of enforcing the securities laws, a “path to compliance with the federal
securities laws . . . even where issuers have conducted an illegal unregis156
tered offering of digital asset securities.” The SEC issued settled orders
against the two companies in relation to the unregistered offering tokens.
147.
Id. at 35.
148.
Id.
149.
See id.
150.
Jay Clayton, Statement on Cryptocurrencies and Initial Coin Offerings, U.S. SEC.
& EXCH. COMM’N (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statementclayton-2017-12-11.
151.
See supra Part II.
152.
Tomahawk Exploration LLC., Securities Act Release No. 10530 at 35, Exchange
Act Release No. 83839, File No. 3-18641 (SEC Aug. 14, 2018) (order).
153.
See, e.g., Joe Loofbourrow, Securities Act Release No. 7700, Exchange Act Release No. 41631, File No. 3-9934 (SEC July 21, 1999) (order); Theodore Sotirakis, Securities
Act No. 7701, File No. 3-9935 (SEC July 21, 1999) (order); Wowauction.com Inc. and Steven
Michael Gaddis, Sr., Securities Act Release No. 7702, File No. 3-9936 (SEC July 21, 1999)
(order).
154.
Carriereq, Inc., Securities Act Release No. 10575 at 28–36, File No. 3-18898 (SEC
Nov. 16, 2018) (order) .
155.
Paragon Coin, Inc., Securities Act Release No. 10574 at 49–57, File No. 3-18897
(SEC Nov. 16, 2018) (order).
156.
Statement on Digital Asset Securities Issuance and Trading, U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM’N (Nov. 16, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/digital-asset-securitesissuuance-and-trading.
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The orders provided that both companies should pay penalties, register the
tokens as securities under Section 12(g) of the Exchange Act, and file peri157
odic reports with the SEC. Furthermore, the SEC required the compensation of investors “who purchased tokens in illegal offerings if an investor
158
elects to make a claim.” The intention of the SEC was to ensure that “investors receive the type of information they would have received had these
issuers complied with the registration provisions of the Securities Act prior
159
to the offer and sale of tokens in their respective ICOs.” Finally, the SEC
explicitly referred to its positive view of technological innovations capable
of benefitting investors and capital markets. At the same time, the agency
emphasized the importance for market participants to adhere to a “wellestablished and well-functioning federal securities law framework when
dealing with technological innovations, regardless of whether the securities
are issued in certificated form or using new technologies, such as block160
chain.”
Despite the SEC’s massive enforcement actions, the SEC Director of
the Division of Corporation Finance, William H. Hinman, excluded an au161
tomatic characterization of ICOs as “securities” in a June 2018 speech. In
Hinman’s view, Ether tokens at the launch of Ethereum did not necessarily
fall under the notion of “security” because of specific factual circumstances
162
that are relevant when determining whether ICO tokens are securities. In
fact, the DAO Report lacked clarifications or indications around “the facts
and circumstances, including the economic realities of the transactions,”
relevant to ascertaining “whether a particular transaction involves the offer
163
and sale of a security—regardless of the terminology used.” Hinman’s
speech questions whether “a digital asset offered as a security can, over
time, become something other than a security,” and provides an illustrative
but not exhaustive list of elements, helpful to take into account as “facts and
circumstances,” that are relevant in considering the applicability of the secu164
rities laws to ICO tokens. This factual analysis is consistent with the Supreme Court’s holding in Howey about the test’s flexibility and adaptability
165
to a broad range of schemes. At the same time, Hinman provides a complimentary analysis by referring to Gary Plastic Packaging v. Merrill
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166

Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith Inc. (“Gary Plastics”), as a relevant precedent, in particular when taking into account the role of the third parties and
the secondary market. In this case the court held that although specific instruments (bank certificates of deposit) were not intrinsically a security
(such as the oranges in Howey), such instruments may still be qualified as
“securities” and subject to the application of the securities law if such in167
struments “animate a broader investment contract.”
In Hinman’s analysis, the role of a third party in driving the expectation
of a return and the “economic substance of the transaction” are two relevant
168
elements, and for both of these elements, he provides a non-exhaustive list
to illustrate the parameters. In relation to the first element, Hinman considers whether there is a person or a group that sponsored and created the sale
of the digital offers and retained a stake or other interest in the digital asset.
Furthermore, he considers whether the “promoter raised an amount of funds
in excess of what may be needed to establish a functional network,” and
169
whether purchasers are “investing . . . [or] seeking a return.” A legitimate
parameter that Hinman explicitly mentions is related to applications of the
Securities Act protections and the specific function of securities laws in
general to correct potential informational asymmetries that may exist be170
tween the promoters and potential purchasers/investors in the digital asset.
Regarding the second element, the “economic substance of the transaction,”
Hinman further considers specific parameters. Among them, Hinman considered whether the token creation relates to speculation and who sets the
price (independent actor or secondary market influencing the trading), the
clarity of the primary motivation related to purchasing digital asset for personal use or consumption, the distribution of the tokens meeting users’
needs, and whether the application is fully functioning or in early stages of
171
development.
On this basis, the Howey test is not the only relevant way to ascertain
the characterization of ICO tokens as security, but Gary Plastics analysis
also comes into play. As Hinman explains,
But this also points the way to when a digital asset transaction may
no longer represent a security offering. If the network on which the
token or coin is to function is sufficiently decentralized – where
purchasers would no longer reasonably expect a person or group to
carry out essential managerial or entrepreneurial efforts – the assets

166.
Hinman, supra note 161 (citing Gary Plastic Packaging Corp. v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 756 F.2d 230, 241 (2d Cir. 1985)).
167.
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may not represent an investment contract. Moreover, when the efforts of the third party are no longer a key factor for determining
the enterprise’s success, material information asymmetries recede.
As a network becomes truly decentralized, the ability to identify an
issuer or promoter to make the requisite disclosures becomes diffi172
cult, and less meaningful.

4. Third Stage: Collaboration with “Market Professionals, and
Especially Gatekeepers”
In addition to providing an extensive interpretation of the notion of “security” (and extending the applicability of the securities laws to any activity
connected to ICOs and more generally cryptocurrencies), the SEC has considered a revolutionary enforcement tool: the “client-attorney” relationship.
After a general remark about the importance for “[m]arket professionals,
especially gatekeepers . . . to act responsibly and hold themselves to high
standards,” SEC Chairman Jay Clayton explicitly referred to responsible legal advice in the context of ICOs, highlighting specific concerns and criti173
calities. First, he considered the situation in which securities lawyers assist clients in structuring offerings of products sharing significant key issues
with securities offerings, but claim that they do not represent securities
products. Second, he refers to the “‘it depends’ equivocal advice” on the
qualification of specific products as securities, instead of “counseling their
174
clients that the product they are promoting likely is a security.” For all
these situations, Chairman Clayton required “the SEC staff to be on high
alert for approaches to ICOs that may be contrary to the spirit of our securi175
ties laws and the professional obligations of the U.S. securities bar.”
A complementary step is the position of the SEC regarding the en176
dorsement of ICOs by celebrities. As the SEC explained, ICO endorsements by celebrities and other social media users “may be unlawful if they
do not disclose the nature, source, and amount of any compensation paid,
directly or indirectly, by the company in exchange for the endorsement,”
since although they may appear unbiased, celebrity endorsement may be
177
part of a paid promotion. In addition, the SEC clarified that ”investment
decisions should not be based solely on an endorsement by a promoter or

172.
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See, e.g., Two Celebrities Charged With Unlawfully Touting Coin Offerings, U.S.
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Nov. 29, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-268.
177.
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other individual,” and “[c]elebrities . . . often do not have sufficient expertise to ensure that the investment is appropriate and in compliance with fed178
eral securities laws.”

5. Fourth Stage: Infrastructures Supporting ICOs, Tokens, and
Cryptocurrencies, Including Broker-Dealers and
Digital Asset Hedge Funds
After providing an extensive interpretation of the notion of “security,” a
further consequential step towards a full enforcement approach by the SEC
consists of extending the application of the federal securities law to those
activities related to the securities, in particular online platforms for trading
digital assets and exchanges, as well as broker-dealers and digital asset
hedge fund managers. Regarding the former, in March 2018, the SEC considered that a vast majority of these platforms provide “a mechanism for
trading assets that meet the definition of a ‘security’ under the federal secu179
rities laws.” The SEC concerns are mostly due to the appearance of online
trading platforms as “SEC-registered and regulated marketplaces” that are
not registered or regulated by the SEC, including those referring to them180
selves as “exchanges.”
The consequence of a non-registration of these platforms with the SEC
as securities exchanges is that the agency and self-regulatory organizations
such as FINRA do not review any standards mentioned by the platforms
when claiming that they “use strict standards to pick only high-quality digi181
tal assets to trade.” Similarly, in these circumstances the SEC has not reviewed any trading protocol implemented by the platforms: such protocols
play a key function in determining the way orders interact and execute, as
well as regulating access to a platform’s trading services, which “may not
182
be the same for all users.”
The SEC warned market participants operating online trading platforms
that platforms trading securities and operating as an “exchange,” in accordance with the definition provided by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(“1934 Act”), must be registered as a national securities exchange or operate
under an exemption from registration, such as the exemption provided for
183
Alternative Trading Systems (“ATSs”) under SEC Regulation ATS.
However, even ATSs—as well as online trading platforms that may not
meet the definition of an exchange under the federal securities laws—that
178.
Id.
179.
Statement on Potentially Unlawful Online Platforms for Trading Digital Asset, U.S.
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Mar. 7, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/
enforcement-tm-statement-potentially-unlawful-online-platforms-trading.
180.
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directly or indirectly offer trading or other services related to digital assets
184
that are securities are subject to specific regulatory requirements.
In November 2018, the SEC charged EtherDelta, “an online platform
that allows buyers and sellers to trade certain digital assets – Ether and
185
“‘ERC20 tokens’ – with secondary market trading.” As the SEC noted,
“From July 12, 2016 to December 15, 2017 . . . more than 3.6 million buy
and sell orders in ERC20 tokens that included securities as defined by Section 3(a)(10) of the Exchange Act were traded on EtherDelta, of which approximately 92% (3.3 million) were traded during the period following the
186
DAO Report.” For this reason, the SEC considered that EtherDelta met
187
the criteria of an “exchange” as defined by Section 3(a)(1) of the Securi188
ties Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 3b-16 and was not excluded under
189
Rule 3b-16(b). In fact, EtherDelta matched “the orders of multiple buyers
and sellers in tokens that included securities as defined by Section 3(a)(10)
of the Exchange Act. The purchasers of such digital tokens invested money
with a reasonable expectation of profits, including through the increased
value of their investments in secondary trading, based on the managerial ef190
forts of others.” An important takeaway is that even a decentralized plat-

184.
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188.
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of a trade
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Exchange Act.” Coburn Release, supra note 185, at *5.
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form operating without a central infrastructure falls within the functional
191
definition of the Securities Exchange Act.
Consistent with this approach, in September 2018, the SEC charged
TokenLot LLC and its owners for acting as unregistered broker-dealers in
192
relation to the sale of digital tokens. TokenLot was charged with soliciting
investors. The platform “actively and broadly solicited the general public to
use the platform to purchase digital tokens,” and advertised digital tokens
available on the platform through a broad range of channels (social media,
193
forums, emailed newsletters). Furthermore, TokenLot had received payment from digital token issuers for promoting the sale of the issuers’ tokens.
In addition to solicitation, TokenLot facilitated initial securities offerings
and transactions in secondary trading, acting as “brokers or dealers in han194
dling investor purchase orders.”
The same approach led the SEC to charge a hedge fund manager for
failure to register an investment vehicle as an investment company, the basis
195
of its investments in digital assets. Crypto Asset Management LLP
(“CAM”) engaged in an “unregistered non-exempt public offering and invest[ed] more than 40 percent of the fund’s assets in digital asset securi196
ties.” Therefore CAM caused the fund (Crypto Asset Fund, CAF) to not
comply with the Investment Company Act. Section 3(a)(1)(C) of the Investment Company Act defines an “investment company” as any issuer
which “is engaged or proposes to engage in the business of investing, reinvesting, owning, holding or trading in securities, and owns or proposes to
acquire investment securities having a value exceeding 40 per centum of the
value of such issuer’s total assets (exclusive of Government securities and
197
cash items) on an unconsolidated basis.” As a consequence of the contacts

191.
Dario de Martino et al., First SEC Enforcement Action Against Unregistered Digital Token Exchange, MORRISON & FOERSTER (2018), https://www.mofo.com/resources/
publications/181109-first-sec-enforcement-tokenexchange.html?utm_source=publications&utm_medium=email#_ftn12.
192.
SEC Charges ICO Superstore and Owners With Operating As Unregistered Broker-Dealers, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Sept. 11, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2018-185.
193.
TokenLot et al., Exchange Act Release No. 84075, 2018 WL 4329662, *2 (Sept.
11, 2018).
194.
Id. at *3.
195.
SEC Charges Digital Asset Hedge Fund Manager with Misrepresentations and
Registration Failures, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Sept. 11, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/
news/press-release/2018-186.
196.
Crypto Asset Mgmt., LP et al., Securities Act Release No. 10544, 2018 WL
4329663 at *2 (Sept. 11, 2018).
197.
Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(1)(C) (2018)). In addition to the violation of Section 3(a)(1)(C) of the Investment Company Act, the SEC contested the violation of Sections
5(a), 5(c), and 17(a)(2) of the Securities Act, Section 206(4) of the Advisers Act and Rule
206(4)-8, and Section 7(a) of the Investment Company Act.
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with the SEC, CAM agreed to cease its public offering, offered buy backs to
198
affected investors, and was ordered to pay a fine of $200,000.

6. Additional Initiatives by Other Authorities
Token sales have also triggered the attention of other regulatory agencies. Among these are the Department of Justice, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”), the Federal Trade Commission, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”), and the Internal Revenue
Service (“IRS”). FinCEN noted that they may trigger the regulation provided for money services business. When issuing an interpretative guide in
2011, FinCEN stated that “[t]he definition of a money transmitter does not
differentiate between real currencies and convertible virtual currencies. Accepting and transmitting anything of value that substitutes for currency
makes a person a money transmitter under the regulations implementing the
199
Bank Secrecy Act.” More recently, FinCEN has confirmed that “[a] developer that sells convertible virtual currency, including in the form of ICO
coins or tokens, in exchange for another type of value that substitutes for
200
currency is a money transmitter and must comply.” On this basis, token
issuers may need to comply with anti-money laundering (“AML”) and
know-your customer (“KYC”) rules. In addition, state money transmitter
201
laws govern all activities related to “money transmission.” In the United
States, each state has the authority to interpret its own money transmission
laws and any state could take the position that the activity involving virtual
currency is subject to regulation, especially if the services also involve the
handling of fiat currency. In this respect, widely divergent positions may
202
emerge.
Virtual currencies may also raise concern as to their tax treatment. In a
notice describing how existing general tax principles apply to transactions
using virtual currency, the IRS treated virtual currency as property for fed-

198.
Id. at *4.
199.
U.S. DEP’T TREASURY FIN. CRIMES NETWORK, FIN-2013-G001, APPLICATION
OF FINCEN’S REGULATIONS TO PERSONS ADMINISTERING, EXCHANGING, OR USING
VIRTUAL CURRENCIES (2013), https://www.fincen.gov/resources/statutes-regulations/
guidance/application-fincens-regulations-persons-administering.
200.
U.S. DEP’T TREASURY FIN. CRIMES NETWORK, LETTER TO THE HONORABLE RON
WYDEN (Feb. 13, 2018), https://coincenter.org/files/2018-03/fincen-ico-letter-march-2018coin-center.pdf.
201.
Wistar Wilson, A Call to Clarify the Regulatory Scope of Money Transmitter Laws,
THE REGULATORY REVIEW (June 19, 2013), https://www.theregreview.org/2013/06/19/a-callto-clarify-the-regulatory-scope-of-money-transmitter-laws. The author notes that in Maryland
the applicable state law specifically covers the reception of any money for transmission “by
any means, including electronically or through the Internet.”
202.
Jennifer L. Moffitt, The Fifty U.S. States and Cryptocurrency Regulations, COIN
ATM RADAR (July 27, 2018), https://coinatmradar.com/blog/the-fifty-u-s-states-andcryptocurrency-regulations/#ftn2.
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eral tax purposes, and therefore transactions using virtual currency are sub203
ject to general tax principles applicable to property transactions.
Courts have also noted the importance of overlapping regulatory regimes. Judge Jack B. Weinstein of the Eastern District of New York upheld
the CFTC’s determination that virtual currencies (including those with respect to which no futures contract is offered) are indeed commodities under
the CEA. More importantly, Judge Weinstein confirmed that “[f]ederal
agencies may have concurrent or overlapping jurisdiction over a particular
204
issue.” Multiple legal treatments result from regulators’ efforts to apply
the existing regulatory framework to new products, and do not lead to unreasonable overlaps. The multiple legal treatments derive from ICOs’ multiple characteristics, and trigger different regulations corresponding to different kinds of protection and regulatory answers.

III. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS OF SEC ENFORCEMENT
A. The Positive Consequences of SEC Enforcement Strategies
In Part I, this Article highlighted two main issues that regulators have to
consider with regard to new technology. First, regulators must consider the
applicability of the existing legal framework to the new technology (as ad205
vocated by Frank H. Easterbrook) and the possibility of enacting new reg206
ulation (as opined by Lawrence Lessig). Second, regulators should not
frustrate innovation.
Considering the applicability of the existing legal framework to ICOs
implies the possibility of extending the federal securities law framework to
ICOs. This would occur through the hermeneutic step of including ICOs
within the definition of “security” provided by the Securities Act (and the
Securities Exchange Act). Although some construe this extension as a way
to frustrate innovation, others argue that it may be a way to create a healthy
environment by providing stability and predictability in the market. This
may have the positive effect of enhancing investor confidence (attracting
207
long-term investors) and in fact fostering innovation.
ICOs and cryptocurrencies represent the most popular application of
blockchain technology. Therefore, a safe regulatory environment is important not only for the direct relevance in these specific contexts, but more

203.
I.R.S. Notice 2014-21.
204.
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. McDonnell, 287 F. Supp. 3d 213, 228
(E.D.N.Y. 2018).
205.
See generally Easterbrook, supra note 4.
206.
See generally Lessig, supra note 4.
207.
See Panos Mourdoukoutas, SEC Won’t Kill ICOs, FORBES (July 30, 2017),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/panosmourdoukoutas/2017/07/30/sec-wont-kill-icos/
#abc9aa43d2eb.
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broadly to foster societal confidence towards the blockchain technology and
its application in daily life. In October 2016, the Federal Reserve emphasized the need for “complex demonstrations in real-world situations before
these technologies can be safely deployed in today’s highly interconnected,
208
synchronized and far-reaching financial markets.” Understandably, such
skepticism was mostly caused by uncertainty regarding blockchain technology and has not been entirely disproven.
The full enforcement implemented by the SEC in the context of ICOs
has led to the creation of a more certain environment, beneficial for nonsophisticated investors as well as for bona fide entrepreneurs who considered ICOs a legitimate and efficient way to finance their entrepreneurial activity in the blockchain space. By extending the federal securities law to
ICOs, the SEC pursued two complementary institutional objectives, namely,
investor protection and preservation of capital formation. Reg S-1 and Reg
209
D filings related to ICOs have increased, with the first Reg S-1 ICO filed
210
March 2018. This is also consistent with the approval of the first Reg A+
offering by Blockstack, which will be able to sell its digital tokens to any211
one (not only to accredited investors as in the case of Reg D). Even the
212
numerical decline of ICOs during 2018 is not necessarily a negative datapoint and may be consistent with the abovementioned data. This holds true
especially considering that the vast majority of them were “scam-like pro-

208.
Lael Brainard, Member, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Remarks at the Institute of International Finance Annual Meeting Panel on Blockchain Washington, D.C. (Oct. 7, 2016), (transcript available at https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/
speech/brainard20161007a.pdf).
209.
A search on the SEC EDGAR Database shows seventeen ICO S-1 filings in 2018
(counting the relevant ones associated with the words “ICO,” “Initial Coin Offerings” and
“Token”). 2018 ICO S-1 Filings, EDGAR, https://searchwww.sec.gov/EDGARFSClient/jsp/
EDGAR_MainAccess.jsp (click “Advanced Search Page,” set Form Type to “S-1,” and set
date range to 01/01/2018-12/31/2018 and search for terms previously listed, ignoring irrelevant results).
There were seventy-five Reg D filings in relation to ICOs in 2018. 2018 ICO Reg D Filings, EDGAR, https://searchwww.sec.gov/EDGARFSClient/jsp/EDGAR_MainAccess.jsp
(click “Advanced Search Page,” set Form Type to “D,” and set date range to 01/01/2018-12/
31/2018 and search for terms “ICOs,” “Initial Coin Offerings,” and “Token,” subtracting the
common projects). Enlarging the spectrum to blockchain-related projects, the same source
reveals that there were sixty-three Reg D filings containing the word “blockchain” in 2018 (in
2017, there were twenty) and forty-four Reg S filings containing the word “blockchain” (in
2017, there were fifteen). Id. This data is from November 1, 2018.
210.
See Praetorian Group, Registration Statement (Form S-1) (Mar. 6, 2018) .
211.
See Blockstack PBC, Offering Circular (Form 1-A) (July 11, 2019),
https://www.stackstoken.com/static/offering-circular-20190711.pdf.
212.
See Funds Raised in 2018, ICODATA, https://www.icodata.io/stats/2018 (last visited Feb. 5, 2020).
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jects.” This may imply that the SEC protected investors while preserving
capital formation.
Indeed, while the role of the SEC is to protect investors as well as preserve capital formation, these two institutional goals may be pursued at a
given time with different intensities. The SEC may favour one of the two
under certain circumstances. However, this is not what happened here. In
fact, the SEC has induced a structural transformation of ICOs with rigorous
enforcement of securities laws. The increased Reg S-1 and Reg D filings
prove that ICOs systematically target private wealthy accredited investors
214
and institutional investors. In doing this, the SEC reduced the exposure of
unsophisticated investors to scams and preserved adequate levels of liquidity in the market.
Although justified by the need to have a fuller understanding of the new
technology, the period preceding the issuance of the DAO Report was characterized by significant inertia, affecting both investors (especially the unsophisticated ones), exposed to the speculative frenzy that characterized the
market starting from the early beginning of 2017, and entrepreneurs, who
could not safely consider this new tool of capital formation.
From a theoretical perspective, certainty is connected to the concepts of
“legal definitions” (especially in normative legal systems) and “legal order.”
Normatively, legal definitions are significant in both the common law and
civil law systems (especially in the context of securities law, which often
implements a “rule-based” approach), specifically with respect to the crea215
tion of a “legal order.” The concept of “order” implies the regularity and
predictability of actions: those entering the market know that their actions
and the actions of others are governed by rules, and therefore that behaviors
are predictable within the perimeter of the rules. In this way order reduces
uncertainty and improves forecasting capacity, because people are confident
in the actions of others. Therefore, both the society and the market benefit
216
from this order.
Financial innovation and disruptive technological innovation conflict
with predictability and forecasting. This generates a high degree of com-

213.
See ICO Market Research Q3 2018, ICO RATING (2018), https://icorating.com/
report/ico-market-research-q3-2018.
214.
See Justina Lee, ICOs Are Turning Exclusive as Wealthy Investors Snatch Up
Deals, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 7, 2018, 8:01 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2018-08-08/token-sales-turn-exclusive-as-private-investors-snatch-up-deals.
215.
See NATALINO IRTI, L’ORDINE GIURIDICO DEL MERCATO 3-11 (2003).
216.
See id. at 4-5. According to this conception, both the market and society are “loci
artificiali,” as opposed to “loci naturali.” See id. at 11. On this topic, see generally FRIDERICH
VON HAYEK, THE CONFUSION OF LANGUAGE IN POLITICAL THOUGHT (1968),
https://iea.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/upldbook508.pdf.
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217

plexity that regulators may not be able to fully understand and confront.
As a consequence, regulators may be tempted to capture such complexity by
issuing a new regulatory framework. The risk of new regulatory frameworks
following technology is that they will produce a sort of “emergency regulation,” wherein the general categories and principles are more fragmented
and difficult to identify and implement. The SEC wisely made efforts to
qualify the new technological developments under the umbrella of federal
securities law, applying a well-known test like Howey, to qualify the moving and evolving target of ICO tokens as “securities” under the Securities
Exchange Act. The definition of “security” is valuable and does not require
any specific implementation to adapt to financial innovation and absorb
market evolution in this context. This fosters order, stability, and legal certainty. As already mentioned, the Howey test is still the best tool in such a
context, due to its incorporation of “a flexible rather than a static principle,
one that is capable of adaptation to meet the countless and variable schemes
devised by those who seek the use of the money of others on the promise of
218
profits.”
A factual evaluation of ICOs as a tool for capital formation leads to the
conclusion that a vast majority of ICOs trigger the application of securities
laws. At the same time, Director Hinman’s suggestion that an ICO token
may not always be characterized as a security is not inconsistent with an extensive interpretation of securities laws and a rigorous application of their
main definitions. Rather, it confirms the relevance of securities laws as the
starting point when evaluating the treatment of specific instruments as “securities.” A reasonable application of the tests developed by the courts does
not require a blind qualification of any instrument as a “security.” This is
especially so when the implementation of securities law would not work to
correct the asymmetries for which it is intended. In this way, the SEC legitimizes securities regulation and the definition of “security” as the parameter
for evaluating any innovative financial instrument. This leads to an improved “legal order” with significant benefits for the entire legal system.
Furthermore, the hermeneutic step of treating ICOs and similar mechanisms as “securities” creates an opportunity to extend securities regulation
to other activities involving ICOs and cryptoassets. The extension of the
federal securities laws to trading platforms (exchanges, ATS, and residual
categories) as well as to hedge fund managers trading in cryptoassets is a
logical consequential implementation of securities regulation pursuing investor protection. The vast majority of trading platforms have proven susceptible to significant malfunctions. For instance, the leading platform

217.
On the regulatory challenges of complexity, see generally Dan Awrey, Complexity,
Innovation and the Regulation of Modern Financial Markets 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 235
(2012).
218.
SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946).
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Coinbase, often proved unstable and unreliable. As a result, the company
openly admitted to “downtime which can impact on the ability to trade,” in
219
a blog post in December 2017. In an environment with high volatility,
where timely execution of orders is essential for investor protection, this
certainly was a critical issue for the platform. If one of the major platforms
is subject to such problems (for reasons that may likely be due to technologic and/or liquidity issues), it is clear that the rest of the less established (and
not registered) trading platforms may be affected by a wide array of problems.
By the same token, a more rigorous application of securities law would
offer more protection from the growing number of market manipulation
practices occurring on cryptocurrency exchanges in the form of “pump-and220
dump” schemes, which are illegal in the majority of public stock markets,
including the London and New York Stock Exchanges. Market manipulation is significant in cryptocurrencies, with an average of two pump-anddump scams every day, generating about $6 million worth of trading vol221
ume a month. A recent case was Paragon, which rose 9,650% in 24 hours,
222
from $ 0.1 to above $ 10 and came back to $ 0.3. As a Business Insider
investigation noted, “pumpers” (crypto traders) implement a specific
scheme, coordinating their action via Telegram and Discord, “inflate the
price of a cryptocurrency by coordinating a few buyers to act at specific
times,” then, using social media and online forums, attract new investors
223
who buy when the price goes up. The pumpers then sell the coins, before
224
the crash, at the expanse of the “second wave of investors.” Together with

219.
Brian Armstrong, Please Invest Responsibly – An Important Message from the
Coinbase Team, COINBASE (Dec. 8, 2017), https://blog.coinbase.com/please-investresponsibly-an-important-message-from-the-coinbase-team-bf7f13a4b0b1. One of the most
relevant paragraphs of the blog post states: “Despite the sizable and ongoing increases in our
technical infrastructure and engineering staff, we wanted to remind customers that access to
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220.
See Pump and Dump Schemes, supra note 87.
221.
See Jiahua Xu & Benjamin Livshits, The Anatomy of a Cryptocurrency Pump-andDump Scheme, 28TH USENIX SECURITY SYMPOSIUM 1609, 1609 (Aug. 17, 2019),
https://www.usenix.org/system/files/sec19-xu-jiahua_0.pdf.
222.
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FINANCE MAGNATES (Jan. 2, 2019), https://www.financemagnates.com/cryptocurrency/
trading/paragon-spikes-9650-in-24-hours-in-apparent-pump-and-dump.
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Oscar Williams-Grut, “Market Manipulation 101”: “Wolf of Wall Street”-Style
“Pump and Dump” Scams Plague Cryptocurrency Markets, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 14, 2017,
2:00 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/ico-cryptocurrency-pump-and-dump-telegram2017-11; see also Shawn Gordon, Anatomy of an ICO Pump and Dump, MEDIUM
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a Russian exchange, Yobit, the American-based exchange Bittrex (a Las
225
Vegas-based exchange) attracted a vast community of “pumpers.” As Xu
and Lisvits explain, these exchanges are themselves directly associated with
pump-and-dump, due to specific benefits that exchanges may extract from
this illegal practice. In fact, exchanges “can profit by dumping [cryptocurrencies] at a higher, pumped price; . . . [can] also earn[] higher transaction
fees due to increased trading volume driven by a pump-and-dump; . . . [and
can] utilize their first access to users’ order information for front-running
226
during a frenzied pump-and-dump.”
Another manipulative practice involves so-called “bots,” automated
227
trading programs that may be used legitimately or illegitimately. Recently, the office of New York Attorney General Barbara D. Underwood ex228
pressed concern for this manipulative risk in crypto-exchanges. Traditional exchanges, such as the New York Stock Exchange, are engaged in
229
monitoring for illegal trading and punishing rule breakers. In contrast,
crypto-exchanges lack structured oversight and are more exposed to abusive
230
practices that may become systematic, absent increased oversight. Due to
the significant losses that they can generate for investors and the underlying
relevance for market integrity, the SEC’s concerns towards market infrastructure are legitimate. Therefore, rigorous enforcement actions in this direction play an essential part in pursuing investor protection.
Furthermore, the risk related to market manipulation is one of the main
231
reasons for rejecting multiple applications by cryptocurrency ETFs. As
Chairman Clayton clarified: “What investors expect is that trading in the
commodity that underlies that ETF makes sense and is free from the risk of
manipulation . . . [however] [t]hose kinds of safeguards do not exist current232
ly in all of the exchange venues where digital currencies trade.” Although
SEC Commissioner Robert Jackson’s statements on ETFs could be inter-

225.
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226.
See Xu & Livshits, supra note 221, at 1610.
227.
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232.
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233

preted optimistically, recent developments suggest that the SEC has not
changed its approach towards cryptocurrency ETFs. Reality Shares ETF
Trusts, belonging to Blockforce Capital, opted for withdrawing an ETF pro234
posal due to exposure to bitcoin futures.
The SEC’s complementary strategy of emphasizing the role of market
professionals, especially gatekeepers, and legal advisors is an important enforcement tool. Legal advisors who provide “it depends” equivocal advice
play a key role in spreading uncertainty (and consequential disorder) in the
context of ICOs. In a transitional era, legal advisors who pursue a conservative approach are beneficial for both their clients and indirectly for potential
investors who may be exposed to significant regulatory risks. Equally relevant is the limitation on endorsements expressed by celebrities, due to their
ability to significantly amplify the speculative frenzy among “street investors,” making them even more exposed and vulnerable to speculation and, in
the worst scenarios, to scams and frauds. Both the SEC statements and potential enforcement actions on legal advisors and celebrities contribute in
different ways to promote and strengthen investor protection.
The systematic implementation of a certain framework of rules produces a further beneficial consequence: it may potentially generate private initiatives and improved standards that create and foster a healthy environment.
The evolution of ICOs towards STOs is an important step, as well as the
creation of so-called ERC-20 tokens, a specific type of token developed on
the Ethereum platform, implementing a specific list of six mandatory stand235
ards, and three optional ones. Further, in an effort to reduce the risks connected to ICOs, Coinbase created a framework enabling the listing of the
token on its platform in full compliance with local regulations “by satisfying
236
listing requests in a jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction manner,” with the possibility that new assets may be listed on platforms available only to customers
237
in select jurisdictions for a period of time.
From the same perspective, the decision to ban ICO advertisement has
been remarkable. It certainly increased the credibility of such platforms
while avoiding potential sanctions issued by the SEC and other federal
agencies. In addition, it operated as a sort of circuit-breaker (to adopt termi233.
See William Suberg, SEC Commissioner Jackson Thinks Regulator Will Approve
BTC
ETF,
Leaked
Interview
Shows,
COINTELEGRAPH
(Feb.
8,
2018),
https://cointelegraph.com/news/sec-commissioner-jackson-thinks-regulator-will-approve-btcetf-leaked-interview-shows.
234.
Nikhilesh De, ETF Tied to Bitcoin Futures Withdrawn After SEC Staff Request,
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235.
See Maxwell William, ERC-20 Tokens, Explained, COINTELEGRAPH (May 12,
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236.
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237.
Id.
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nology belonging to securities regulation) with regard to the speculative spiral, characterizing the sector. The result is further protection for social media users, most of whom are unsophisticated investors, from potential irresponsible decisions. Facebook was the first social media platform that opted
238
for such a measure, clearly stating as its goal that “people continue to discover and learn about new products and services through Facebook ads
239
without fear of scams or deception.” As Facebook further explained, it intentionally opted for a broad policy and is continuing to work “to better detect deceptive and misleading advertising practices, and enforcement will
begin to ramp up across our platforms including Facebook, Audience Net240
work and Instagram.” This decision triggered a homogeneous reaction of
other “Big Techs,” in particular Google and Twitter. Similarly, Google’s
new Financial Services Policy (implemented in June 2018) bans “cryptocurrency and related content (including but not limited to initial coin offerings,
cryptocurrency exchanges, cryptocurrency wallets, and cryptocurrency trad241
ing advice).” This new policy will be extended to Google search, Googleowned platforms (including YouTube), and display-advertising on third242
party sites. Google further implemented the decision by “pulling cryptocurrency mining extensions” from the Chrome Web Store on April 2, 2018
243
244
(and delisted in June) after “90%” failed to comply with its rules.
From a broader perspective, a certain and safe regulatory environment
has the advantage of making the United States more competitive in the international arena. Although the United States has always been perceived as
the most developed and sophisticated regulatory environment for corporations and securities, blockchain and ICOs led to the emergence of important
competitors, such as Switzerland and Singapore. In both these countries, the
governments as well as their respective financial authorities (FINMA and

238.
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MAS, respectively) implemented clear and efficient rules. Consistent with a
“do no harm” approach, the Swiss legislation adopted a principle-based regulation for financial markets, and implemented a principle of “technology
245
neutrality.” In Singapore, MAS has been one of the first movers when
considering a regulation for blockchain; with regard to ICOs, it took the position that digital tokens offered in Singapore shall be regulated by the MAS
“if the digital tokens constitute products regulated under the Securities and
246
Futures Act” and confirmed the decision not to regulate virtual currencies.
From this perspective, the creation of the FinHub and the possibility of
adhering to a “path to compliance” as in the two recent cases In re Carriereq Inc., d/b/a AirFox, and In re Paragon Coin Inc. may be beneficial for
the competitiveness of the U.S. market. These initiatives prove that the SEC
is not hostile to new technologies (including blockchain). The SEC seems
rather to pursue the opposite interest of proactively creating a collaborative
environment, where market participants can benefit from ex-ante guidance
provided by the FinHub and ex-post opportunities of compliance with the
securities laws, even after a breach. This is the expression of a general trend
of “eagerness in regulatory agencies to understand the promise of the new
247
248
technology,” with the CFTC organizing FinTech forums and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) opening an Office of Innova249
tion.

B. Potentially Negative Effects to Be Addressed
Notwithstanding the benefits emerging from the application of the securities laws to ICOs, this strategy may also have negative effects.
An obvious objection to the extension of the federal securities regulation to ICOs relates to the increased costs of compliance, particularly relevant in the world of blockchain, which is entirely dominated by highly innovative start-ups. Clearly, a trade-off between compliance costs and

245.
Financial Technology and Digitalisation, FINMA (2016), https://www.finma.ch/
en/documentation/dossier/dossier-fintech/finanztechnologie-und-digitalisierung-2016; MAS
Clarifies Regulatory Position on the Offer of Digital Tokens in Singapore, MONETARY
AUTHORITY SING. (Aug. 1, 2017), www.mas.gov.sg/News-and-Publications/Media-Releases/
2017/MAS-clarifies-regulatory-position-on-the-offer-of-digital-tokens-in-Singapore.aspx.
246.
Id.
247.
Hester M. Peirce, Commissioner, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Lasting Impressions:
Remarks Before the CV Summit—Crypto Valley (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/
speech/peirce-lasting-impressions-crypto-valley-summit.
248.
U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, CFTC ANNOUNCES AGENDA FOR
FINTECH FORWARD 2018 CONFERENCE (Sept. 28, 2018), https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/
PressReleases/7810-18.
249.
CFPB Office of Innovation Proposes “Disclosure Sandbox” for Companies to Test
New Ways to Inform Consumers, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU (Sept. 13, 2018),
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/blog/bcfp-office-innovation-proposes-disclosuresandbox-fintech-companies-test-new-ways-inform-consumers.
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innovation exists: by increasing compliance costs, rules may reduce possibilities for new actors to disrupt the market. The so-called Simple Agreement for Tokens (“SAFT”), modeled after Simple Agreement for Equity
(“SAFE”), emerged as a way to avoid the qualification of ICOs as securities, and consequentially reduce costs. With a similar intent, so-called airdrops spread in the blockchain start-ups space as an alternative to “more
250
traditional” ICOs.
The same incentives that push individual entrepreneurs to identify alternatives to the application of the federal securities regulators may be observed at a higher level, when taking into account regulatory initiatives to
regulate blockchain, smart-contracts, and ICOs at the state level. The implementation of a rigid federal regulatory enforcement may favor state level
initiatives, aimed at attracting new entrepreneurial initiatives, by creating
safe-harbors to the federal securities laws. The most significant example is
the state of Wyoming, which implemented an aggressive strategy aimed at
251
attracting blockchain-oriented business developments. The state of Wyoming recently adopted five bills on a broad range of issues related to blockchain. In particular, the Wyoming House Bill 70 - Open blockchain tokens252
exemptions (HB 70) tries to “carve out” an exemption for “utility tokens”
253
by “laying down the law at the state level.” In relation to so-called “utility
tokens,” HB 70 creates an exemption from specified securities and money
transmission laws for persons “who develop, sell or facilitate the exchange
254
255
of an open blockchain token” A recent bill provides for enhanced clarity
on digital assets, identifying three different categories: digital securities,
256
digital assets, and cryptocurrencies.
The way states issued “ad-hoc” regulations may be viewed as an unusual and radical way to force the SEC to reconsider its extensive approach of
securities laws towards ICOs to bring about a more flexible regime. One of
the reasons why the SEC adopted such an “expansive approach” may relate
250.
Brady Dale, So Long ICOs, Hello Airdrops: The Free Token Giveaway Craze Is
Here, COINDESK (Mar. 16, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://www.coindesk.com/long-icos-helloairdrops-free-token-giveaway-craze.
251.
Mathew De Silva, Wyoming Legislature Goes All In On Blockchain, Cryptocurrency Bills, ETH NEWS (Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.ethnews.com/wyoming-legislature-goes-allin-on-blockchain-cryptocurrency-bills.
252.
H.R. 0070, 64th Leg., 2018 Budget Sess. (Wyo. 2018).
253.
Rachel Wolfson, U.S. State Of Wyoming Defines Cryptocurrency “Utility Tokens”
As New Asset Class, FORBES (Mar. 13, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/rachelwolfson/
2018/03/13/u-s-state-of-wyoming-defines-cryptocurrency-utility-tokens-as-new-asset-class/
#499e23d04816.
254.
H.R. 0070, 64th Leg., 2018 Budget Sess. (Wyo. 2018).
255.
S. SF0125, 2019 Leg., 2019 Sess. (Wyo. 2019).
256.
Darryin Pollock, Wyoming Introduces Bill Offering Cryptocurrencies Legal Clarity
to Attract Blockchain Business, FORBES (Jan. 18, 2019, 3:40 PM), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/darrynpollock/2019/01/18/wyoming-introduces-bill-offering-cryptocurrencies-legalclarity-to-attract-blockchain-business/#7937c96c46d5.
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to the structure of American federal agencies. The case of ICOs and cryptocurrencies is emblematic: by leading to a system with significant overlaps
and concurrent jurisdiction, such structure may be an incentive for the SEC
to establish itself as the main regulator in the space.
Significant negative consequences may arise from such state-level regulation of ICO tokens. First, it may lead to the creation of friction and conflicts of law in the short to medium term. Second, such regulatory fragmentation significantly increases uncertainty, with negative consequences for
the international competitiveness of the United States, when compared to
the above-mentioned international competitors (Switzerland and Singapore).
Third, regulatory-state initiatives may trigger systematic competition be257
tween states: different from corporate law where Delaware law “won” the
258
competition, effective securities regulation required the creation of a federal framework. In the present context, the risk of a “race to the bottom” rather than a “race to the top” is very real, due to a lack of established standards existing within the industry. Particularly relevant is the definition of
“blockchain” and “smart contracts” that many different States have adopt259
ed. For this reason the Chamber of Digital Commerce, which emerged as
one of the most important blockchain industry representatives in the United
States, advocates the application of the existing federal regulatory framework, discouraging the individual states from developing independent defi260
nitions and regulations.
In addition to the coordination of regulatory agencies and states, coordination of divisions and offices internal to the SEC and of the regulatory

257.
American scholars have analyzed this topic for a long time. See, e.g., Curtis Alva,
Delaware and the Market for Corporate Charters: History and Agency, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L.
885 (1990); Catherine Barnard, Social Dumping Revisited: Some Lessons from Delaware?,
ARCHIVE EUR. INTEGRATION (1999); William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller,
Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469 (1987);
Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 225 (1985). For the effects of the choice of Delaware on the value of the company, see,
e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State
Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435 (1992); Reinhardt H. Schmidt &
Gerald Spindler, Path Dependence, Complementarity and Corporate Governance, in
CONVERGENCE AND PERSISTENCE IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 114 (Jeffrey N. Gordon &
Mark J. Roe eds., 2004); Guhan Subramanian, The Disappearing Delaware Effect, 20 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 32 (2004); Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value? (Columbia Law Sch. Ctr. for Studies in Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 159, 2001) .
258.
See Marcel Kahan and Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate
Law, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679 (2002).
259.
See Marco Dell’Erba, Do Smart Contracts Require a New Legal Framework? Regulatory Fragmentation, Self-Regulation, Public Regulation, 5 U. PA. J.L. & PUB. AFF. (forthcoming 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3228445.
260.
Joint Statement in Response to State “Smart Contracts” Legislation, CHAMBER OF
DIGITAL COMMERCE (Apr. 2018), https://digitalchamber.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/
Joint-Ltr-State-Smart-Contracts-Legislation.pdf.

Spring 2020]

From Inactivity to Full Enforcement

219

agencies involved in cryptocurrencies and ICOs is also important. From the
perspective of the SEC’s internal governance, the Commission recognized
the need to coordinate internal efforts “across all SEC Divisions and Offices
regarding the application of U.S. securities laws to emerging digital asset
technologies and innovations, including Initial Coin Offerings and crypto261
currencies,” and appointed an ad-hoc Associate Director in the Division
262
of Corporate Finance. As for coordination among authorities, in February
2018 SEC Chairman Jay Clayton and the CFTC Chairman Christopher
Giancarlo jointly signed a note on the how important it is to “work together
to bring transparency and integrity to these markets and, importantly, to deter and prosecute fraud and abuse . . . to be nimble and forward-looking; coordinated with our state, federal and international colleagues; and engaged
263
with important stakeholders, including Congress.” However, the reality
led to different developments in key areas. For example, while the CTFC
allowed crypto-derivatives markets to develop, the SEC adopted a more
conservative approach, and did not approve “any application[s] to list an exchange-traded product based on cryptocurrencies or crypto-derivatives trade
264
on U.S. exchanges.” As the SEC Commissioner Pierce underlined, this
conservative approach is a result of “a discomfort with the underlying markets in which cryptocurrencies trade, a skepticism of the ability of markets
to develop organically outside of a traditionally regulated context, and a
lack of appreciation for the investor interest in gaining exposure to digital
265
assets as part of a balanced investment portfolio.” This remark is helpful
to analyze a last broader issue.
Critical to evaluating the SEC’s enforcement strategy is recognizing
that the SEC did not adequately emphasize the importance of selfregulation. A rigid and rigorous strategy of enforcement may contradict the
systematic promotion of self-regulatory initiatives. In contrast, the CFTC,
through Commissioner Brian Quintenz, recently promoted self-regulatory
266
initiatives with regard to cryptocurrencies.
While recommended as an important tool by the International Organiza267
tion of Securities Commissions (“IOSCO”), self-regulation has often been
criticized after the financial crisis of 2008. Starting from the assumption that
261.
SEC Names Valerie A. Szczepanik Senior Advisor for Digital Assets and Innovation, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (June 4, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/
2018-102.
262.
Id.
263.
Clayton & Giancarlo, supra note 5.
264.
Peirce, supra note 247.
265.
Id.
266.
Brian Quintenz, Commissioner, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Keynote Address by
Commissioner Brian Quintenz Before the DC Blockchain Summit (Mar. 7. 2018),
https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opaquintenz8.
267.
See Int’l Org. of Sec. Comm’ns [IOSCO], Objectives and Principles Of Securities
Regulation 5 (May 2017), https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD561.pdf.
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self-regulatory organizations (“SROs”) mainly operate in the interest of
their members, they have traditionally raised concerns over inadequate incentives for the enforcement of a set of rules whose purpose may be effec268
tive protection of the interests of the community. Although the expansion
of private regulation is often perceived “either as an expression of privatization or as a tool intended to re-regulate liberalized or deregulated fields in a
more regulated-friendly environment,” private actors do not systematically
269
opt for implementing deregulation or a lower degree of regulation.
The American system has historically been very familiar with selfregulatory initiatives, and in particular the SEC and the CTFC have often
delegated to SROs (securities industry organizations that are owned and op270
erated by their members) a significant part of their regulatory powers. In
general, the role of SROs consists of promoting professionalism of participants through examinations and licensing, designing rules governing their
members’ practices, as well as enforcing their own rules and the federal securities laws, while conducting disciplinary proceedings and imposing sanc271
tions on members for violations. By promoting the creation of SROs for
ICOs, the SEC would further normalize the regulatory debate in this sphere,
while identifying adequate regulatory solutions and benefiting from specialized industry representatives who are committed to developing adequate
272
regulatory standards beneficial for both the industry and investors.
In Switzerland, FINMA successfully created an efficient self-regulatory
framework. Consistent with an established tradition recognizing the im273
portance of self-regulation as a tool beneficial for the markets, FINMA
allowed the Crypto Valley Association to create independent policies. This
regulatory approach contributed to the emergence of Zug’s Crypto Valley as
268.
For an economic analysis see generally DAVID P. MCCAFFREY & DAVID W. HART,
WALL STREET POLICES ITSELF: HOW SECURITIES FIRMS MANAGE THE LEGAL HAZARDS OF
COMPETITIVE PRESSURES (1998); HEDVAH L. SHUCHMAN, SELF-REGULATION IN THE
PROFESSIONS: ACCOUNTING, LAW, MEDICINE (1981).
269.
Fabrizio Cafaggi, Rethinking Private Regulation in the European Regulatory
Space, Reframing Self-Regulation 4 (Eur. Univ. Inst., Working Paper No. 2006/13, 2006),
http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/4369/LAW2006.13.PDF;jsessionid=C
75C897F5D17F4052CCC2500F282B83D?sequence=1.
270.
SROs are securities industry organizations that are owned and operated by their
members. Examples of SROs are the National Association of Securities Dealers (“NASD”),
the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”), the Chicago Board Options Exchange, and regional
stock and option exchanges.
271.
Peter De Marzo et al., Contracting and Enforcement with a Self-Regulatory Organization, at 1 (Aug. 2001), http://ssrn.com/abstract=297302; see also Peter M. DeMarzo et al. ,
Self-Regulation and Government Oversight, 72 REV. EC. ST. 687 (2005).
272.
For an analysis of self-regulation, see generally Julia Black, Constitutionalising
Self-Regulation, 59 MOD. L. REV. 25 (1996); Julia Black Decentering Regulation: Understanding the Role of Regulation and Self-Regulation in a ‘Post-Regulatory’ World, 54
CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 113 (2001).
273.
Self-Regulation In Swiss Financial Market Law, SWITZ. FINANCIAL MARKET
SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY, https://www.finma.ch/en/documentation/self-regulation.
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274

one of the global blockchain hubs. In Hong Kong, the Fintech Association
of Hong Kong identified a certain number of best practices for token sales
275
since December 2017. A similar initiative took place in the United King276
dom, with the establishment of CryptoUK. Furthermore, the Japanese Financial Services Agency authorized the Japan Virtual Currency Exchange
277
Association (JVCEA) as a self-regulatory body in Japan.
In the United States, some private organizations have emerged in the
last years or months: the Wall-Street Blockchain Alliance, the Chamber of
Digital Commerce, the Brooklyn Project by Consensys, Messari (aspiring to
278
be the “open source” SEC’s Edgar homologue in the crypto space), the
Crypto Community Watch, and more recently the Stablecoin Foundation
(mainly focused on stablecoins) and the Virtual Commodity Association
(“VCA”). The VCA was proposed in March 2018 and launched in August
2018, and similar to the JVCEA focuses on cryptoexchanges and custodi279
280
ans. It is the industry’s first (and only) self-regulatory organization.

C. Current Developments
1. Token Taxonomy Act
281

The newly proposed Token Taxonomy Act, a bipartisan initiative
promoted by Congressmen Warren Davidson and Darren Soto, polarized the
political debate at the end of 2018 and may be a key issue in the coming
months. First introduced in December 2018, it was reintroduced in April
2019, with Congressmen Josh Gottheimer, Tedd Budd, Scott Perry,
274.
Komfie Manalo, Blockchain’s Way Forward Is Self-Regulation, Swiss Crypto Executive Says, CRYPTOVEST (Jul. 26, 2018), https://cryptovest.com/news/blockchains-wayforward-is-self-regulation-swiss-crypto-executive-says.
275.
Best Practices for Token Sales, FINTECH ASS’N OF H.K. (Oct. 2018),
https://ftahk.org/publication/updated-ftahk-best-practices-token-sales-version-20-october2018-document.
276.
See Code of Conduct, CRYPTOUK, https://www.cryptocurrenciesuk.info/code-ofconducts (last visited Feb. 2, 2020).
277.
Omar Faridi, Japan’s Virtual Currency Exchange Association (JVCEA) Now Authorized
as
Self-Regulatory
Body
CRYPTOGLOBE
(Oct.
24,
2018),
https://www.cryptoglobe.com/latest/2018/10/japan-s-virtual-currency-exchange-associationjvcea-now-authorized-as-self-regulatory-body.
278.
TwoBitIdiot, Introducing Messari: An Open-Source EDGAR Database for Cryptoassets, MESSARI (Oct. 26, 2017), https://medium.com/tbis-weekly-bits/introducing-messarian-open-source-edgar-database-for-cryptoassets-46fec1b402f6.
279.
See Aaron Stanley, Just In Time? Winklevoss-Backed Crypto Self-Regulatory Effort
Picks Up Steam, FORBES (Aug. 20, 2018, 6:04 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/astanley/
2018/08/20/just-in-time-winklevoss-backed-crypto-self-regulatory-group-has-liftoff/
#4a2cc0902ea5.
280.
See Paul Vigna, Winklevoss Effort to Self-Regulate Cryptocurrency Gets Members,
WALL ST. J. (Aug. 20, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/winklevoss-effort-to-self-regulatecryptocurrency-gets-members-1534804308.
281.
Token Taxonomy Act of 2019, H.R. 2144, 116th Cong. (2019).
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282

and Tulsi Gabbard cosponsoring the new version of the bill. The Token
Taxonomy Act is a further direct consequence of the SEC’s enforcement
strategy. In a context with no clear statutory direction, the SEC was forced
283
to refer to the Howey test as a “lodestar,” and apply the securities laws as
the only way to pursue its statutory missions. The SEC’s clear approach of
defining digital tokens as “securities” has led to the proposal of the Token
Taxonomy Act that proposes to amend the Securities Act and Exchange
284
Act’s definition of “security” and to add definitions for “digital tokens”
285
and “digital units.” Congressman Davidson emphasized the importance of
certainty (together with no over-regulation) in the early days of the Internet
286
as a key for America’s innovation and a critical element to successfully
287
compete with Switzerland and Singapore as a hub for cryptoeconomics,
288
while pursuing investor protections. The Token Taxonomy Act achieves
these goals by implementing the bottom-line philosophy that the existence
289
of a functional network should exclude the applicability of securities laws.
The Token Taxonomy Act excludes digital tokens from the definition of
“security” and exempts “transactions involving the development, offer, or
290
sale of a digital unit” under specific conditions from the Securities Act. In
this way, the Token Taxonomy Act implements the view that digital tokens
do represent an alternative asset class, and provides a definition of “digital
token” based on four main elements: how the digital token is created, how
282.
See Nikhilesh De, Lawmakers Reintroduce Bill to Exempt Crypto Tokens From US
Securities Laws, COINDESK (Apr. 9, 2019, 7:01 PM), https://www.coindesk.com/lawmakersreintroduce-bill-to-exempt-tokens-from-us-securities-laws.
283.
Stephen Crimmins & Matthew Comstock, How Congress Could Change The Game
for Digital Tokens, LAW360 (Jan. 10, 2019, 2:45 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/
1116952/how-congress-could-change-the-game-for-digital-tokens.
284.
Art. 2 of the Token Taxonomy Act defines “digital token” as “a digital unit that (A)
is created (i) in response to the verification or collection of proposed transactions; (ii) pursuant
to rules for the digital unit’s creation and supply that cannot be altered by a single person or
group of persons under common control; or (iii) as an initial allocation of digital units that
will otherwise be created in accordance with clause (i) or (ii); (B) has a transaction history that
(i) is recorded in a distributed, digital ledger or digital data structure in which consensus is
achieved through a mathematically verifiable process; and (ii) after consensus is reached, resists modification or tampering by a single person or group of persons under common control;
(C) that is capable of being traded or transferred between persons without an intermediate custodian; and (D) that is not a representation of a financial interest in a company, including an
ownership interest or revenue share.” Token Taxonomy Act of 2019, H.R. 2144, 116th Cong.
§ 2(a)(20) (2019).
285.
Id. § 2(a). In the Act, a digital unit is defined as “a representation of economic, proprietary, or access rights that is stored in a computer-readable format.’’ Id.
286.
See Press Release, Congressmen Warren Davidson, Darren Soto Introduce ICO Fix
for Businesses, Consumers (Dec. 20, 2018), https://davidson.house.gov/media-center/pressreleases/congressmen-warren-davidson-darren-soto-introduce-ico-fix-businesses.
287.
Id.
288.
See Crimmins & Comstock, supra note 283.
289.
Id.
290.
Id.
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the underlying ledger operates, how transactions are executed, and what the
token represents. Furthermore, the proposed Section 4(a)(8), amending the
291
Securities Act, creates a “transactional exemption” from registration requirements if the “person developing, offering, or selling the digital unit has
292
a reasonable and good faith belief that the digital unit is a digital token.”
In this case, individuals have ninety days following a written notification
from the Commission that the digital unit counts as a security to post public
notice of such notification and take reasonable efforts to terminate all sales
and return all proceeds originating from the sale, except for funds reasonably spent on the development of technology associated with the digital
293
unit. This is consistent with the two recent SEC decisions leading to a
“path to compliance,” In re Carriereq Inc., d/b/a AirFox and In re Paragon
294
Coin Inc. In addition to the definitional changes applying to the Securities
Act, further amendments were proposed for the Exchange Act. A “digital
token” is defined under the same definition proposed for the Securities Act,
but is excluded from the definition of “security.” As a consequence, nonregistered broker-dealers do not infringe federal securities laws if they
295
transact in digital tokens.
If approved, the Token Taxonomy Act would reduce or even stop the
regulatory competition (and the potential regulatory arbitrage) that emerged
at the state level. Furthermore, it may contribute to a harmonized approach
to ICOs and digital tokens, avoiding any risk of regulatory fragmentation,
and benefitting the United States as a major blockchain/ICO hub. This is the
way the European Union is currently structuring its regulatory action on
296
crypto-assets and ICOs. The European Banking Authority (“EBA”) and
297
the European Securities and Market Authority (“ESMA”) advocated for a
common framework to pursue investor protection and safeguard investments, and the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament has proposed to regulate ICOs in the context of the crowd298
funding activities. Although the United States is the country with the

291.
Id.
292.
Token Taxonomy Act, H.R. 2144, 116th Cong. § 2 (c)(8)(A)(2019).
293.
Id. § 2(c)(8)(B).
294.
See supra Part II(B)(3).
295.
See H.R. 2144 §§ 3(b)-(c).
296.
See Report with Advice for the European Commission by European Banking Authority, at 7-9 (Jan. 9, 2019), https://eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/2545547/
EBA+Report+on+crypto+assets.pdf.
297.
See Advice Initial Coin Offering and Crypto-Assets by European Securities
and Markets Authority, ESMA50-157-1391, at 4–7, 21 (Jan. 9, 2019),
https://www.esma.europa.eu/file/49978/download?token=56LqdNMN.
298.
Report on the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the
Council on European Crowdfunding Service Providers (ECSP) for Business, EUR. PARL.
DOC. A8-0364 (2018), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-8-2018-0364_
EN.pdf?redirect.
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299

highest number of ICO projects, Europe has emerged as the world’s dominant “crypto region” in 2018, with a value of “token sales” reaching 4.1 billion U.S. dollars, against $2.6 billion in the United States and $2.3 billion in
Asia, with important initiatives in France, Switzerland, and the United
300
Kingdom. Europe also leads in the overall amount of investments in
301
Fintech for 2018.
In addition to the Token Taxonomy Act, the SEC is opening the possibility of further interpretation of the existing framework. SEC Commissioner Hester M. Pierce’s recent speech suggests that token offerings do not always fall perfectly within the scheme of securities offerings, and the
decentralized nature of token offerings may imply that a company does not
truly own or control the capital raised through token sales. Furthermore,
Commissioner Pierce notes that decentralization affects the traditional functions of “issuers” or “promoters” that may “be performed by a number of
302
unaffiliated people, or by no one at all.” As these words seem to suggest,
a different approach may depend on the way decentralization will be inter303
preted. While a re-assessment of the Howey test or the formalization of a
new test related to “decentralization” may be possible, this concept requires
a more in-depth analysis by regulators and academics, and at the moment it
would be difficult to make any consideration or prediction in this regard.

2. Stablecoins
304

Stablecoins represent an important market development. Stablecoins
are cryptocurrencies maintaining a stable value against a target price, gener305
ally the U.S. dollar. Stablecoins combine liquid collateral (such as gold or
306
the U.S. dollar) or algorithmic mechanisms of stabilization with the man-

299.
ICO Statistics - By Country, ICO Watch List, (last visited Feb. 5, 2020),
https://icowatchlist.com/statistics/geo.
300.
Trista Kelley, Europe is Killing it in Crypto, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 16, 2018),
https://www.businessinsider.com/value-crypto-ico-europe-us-asia-2018-10; Hannah Murphy
& David Keohane, France Plans Rules to Lure Cryptocurrency Business, FIN. TIMES (Mar.
22, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/2e7b2778-2d22-11e8-9b4b-bc4b9f08f381.
301.
See KPMG, THE PULSE OF FINTECH 2018 31 (Jul. 31, 2018), https://assets.kpmg/
content/dam/kpmg/xx/pdf/2018/07/h1-2018-pulse-of-fintech.pdf.
302.
Peirce, supra note 95.
303.
See Todd Henderson & Max Raskin, A Regulatory Classification of Digital Assets:
Towards an Operational Howey Test for Cryptocurrencies, ICOs, and Other Digital Assets
2019 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 443, 549 (2019).
304.
For a broad analysis, see generally Marco Dell’Erba, Stablecoins in Cryptoeconomics: From Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs) to Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs), N.Y.U.
J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 5 (2019).
305.
Nathan Sexer, State of Stablecoins, CONSENSYS MEDIA (July 24, 2018),
https://media.consensys.net/the-state-of-stablecoins-2018-79ccb9988e63.
306.
Sherman Lee, Explaining Stable Coins, The Holy Grail Of Cryptocurrency,
FORBES (Mar. 12, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/shermanlee/2018/03/12/explainingstable-coins-the-holy-grail-of-crytpocurrency/#4db76f8f4fc6.
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agement of the supply “to incentivize the market to trade the coin for no
307
more or less than $1.” A collateral of high quality (those that are extremely liquid, such as the U.S. dollar or gold) should in principle lead to the dual
effect of making the stablecoin both stable and liquid. A new wave of stablecoins implement models that use other digital assets as collateral or are
not collateralized at all, opting for riskier algorithmic mechanisms of price
308
stabilization.
Stablecoins experienced an exponential growth in the last two years.
309
Their market value marked an impressive growth of 700% in 2018 and
310
gained further momentum in 2019. Stablecoins emerged as a global phenomenon, with projects in North America, Europe, Asia, the Middle East,
and Oceania. Stablecoins are also attracting important global market play311
ers, such as banks (in particular J.P. Morgan ) and technology players (including Facebook, Amazon, Paypal). These stakeholders may have different
interests in stablecoins. While J.P. Morgan intended to develop a framework
for efficiently managing internal operations with JP Coin, the Libra Foundation (regrouping Facebook, Amazon, and other prominent giant techs) conceives Libra Coin as a global payment system, open in principle to a very
312
broad audience.
Stablecoins are interesting for several reasons. Their hybrid characteristics may lead to an interplay between different regulatory authorities (such
as the SEC and CFTC), who may have jurisdiction over this new product.
As a consequence, stablecoins will be useful in testing the interpretation of
313
the securities and commodities regulations with regard to tokens and cryptocurrencies. Furthermore, they will serve to verify whether enhanced coordination at the national as well as at the international level (IMF, World
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Bank, Financial Stability Forum, G20) can be achieved in the context of
cryptocurrencies. Finally, from a purely monetary policy perspective, stablecoins triggered an unprecedented debate on the legitimacy of similar initiatives that could potentially undermine the role of “public” central bankers. Therefore, stablecoins may be a catalyst for public initiatives leading to
the creation of public stablecoins, with potential disruptive consequences for
the existing market and banking structure.

Conclusion
The SEC’s decision to fully enforce the securities laws in the ICO context should be considered a positive, and it certainly contributes to the creation of a safer (and healthier) environment for ICOs, with positive consequences for the development of the entire blockchain industry and its socalled “second generation applications” based on smart-contracts. The recent creation of the FinHub and the possibility to adhere to a “path to compliance” as in the two recent cases In re Carriereq, Inc., d/b/a AirFox and In
re Paragon Coin Inc. may have opened an era of enhanced collaboration
between the Commission and market participants. In this environment, market participants can benefit from prior guidance provided by FinHub and
opportunities to comply with the securities laws after a breach. An essential
precondition is a “well-established and well-functioning federal securities
law framework, to be applied when dealing with securities law framework
regardless of whether the securities are issued in certificated form or using
314
new technologies, such as blockchain.”
After the shift towards a phase characterized by more systematic securities law enforcement, data on ICOs demonstrates that such an approach has
not irreversibly damaged the industry. The United States holds primacy in
315
terms of number of projects worldwide (15.94%), and U.S. investments in
316
the first half of 2018 have overcame 2017’s total, as reported by
317
KPMG. In addition, the growing number of Reg D and Reg S-1 filings
related to ICOs (and more generally to blockchain) indicate that ICOs have
reached a new phase in which entrepreneurs, developers, and issuers more
appropriately target accredited and institutional investors (in principle, more
expert and sophisticated investors), rather than non-sophisticated investors.
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A prolonged phase of non-intervention would have increased uncertainty to the detriment of investors and entrepreneurs and put the United States
at a disadvantage in the international arena. However, in the short to medium term, it will be important to address the potential fragmentation of the
securities law framework, a risk emerging from the adoption of state-level
regulation aimed at attracting new entrepreneurial initiatives. Similar risks
may originate from a lack of coordination between the authorities involved
in cryptocurrencies and ICOs, in particular the SEC and the CFTC. Further,
the SEC should take steps to identify authoritative industry representatives,
promoting the creation of SROs that may contribute to the development of
reliable self-regulatory standards.

